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ABSTRACT
In recent years, computer networks have significantly increased in both
complexity and number, and these networks are attractive targets for attack and
intrusion. Unix networks being managed by the government and providing access to
unclassified sensitive information are particularly vulnerable to attack.
Ensuring the security of sensitive information will be one of the single most
important management issues in computer/information security in the foreseeable
future. Unfortunately, the number of automated security tools for Unix, as well as the
number of computer security experts within DOD, has not increased sufficiently to keep
up with the improvements in technology.
The author proposes the concept of a security toolbox, containing a proposed
standard set of automated security tools, to support Unix networks. The toolbox can be
used to enhance system security, automating many of the security related tasks required
of the network administrator. Additionally, organizational changes will be necessary to
improve the availability of computer security advice and assistance. It is recommended
that a study of the function and organization of computer security expertise be
conducted, so that access to and validation of security tools, along with consistent
guidance for network administrators and security officers, can be accomplished
effectively. The combination of a security toolbox and expert advice can then help
bridge the gap in the development of computer security expertise. Accesion For
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In this thesis, the author focuses on the importance of improving network security,
particularly for government-owned Unix networks. Furthermore, the author proposes
the development of a security toolbox and addresses organizational support issues
related to the improvement of network security. it should be noted that the security
toolbox is a concept which can be implemented quickly, using tools which have already
been developed.
The introduction of the thesis sets the stage by reviewing advances in computer
technology, the impact of vast computer networks such as the Internet, and the security
problems associated with Unix networks. The utilization of Unix networks on the
Internet is highlighted as a specific point of vulnerability.
After the introduction, a discussion of iecent trends in computer security and some
of the key issues for Unix administrators is presented. This section of the thesis will
compare some of the better security tools currently available to assist the administrator
or security officer in maintaining a Unix network. Each of the tools is presented in such
a way that the strengths and weaknesses are highlighted.
Next, the author reviews organizational roles for computer security within the
government. The organizations described are the primary repositories of computer
security expertise in the government. These organizations include the Computer
Emergency Response Team, Computer Incident Advisory Capability, Computer
Network Security Response Team, Defense Information Systems Agency, National
Computer Security Center, National Institute Standards and Technology, and the
National Security Agency; all of which play a role in the advancement of computer
security capabilities.
xi
A primary focus of the thesis is addressed in the section on automated security
tools for Unix networks and introduction of the security toolbox. The rationale for a
security toolbox is discussed, in conjunction with implementation issues.
Implementation issues include training, organizational support, tool installation, and
tool utilization. Finally, the chapter explores the need for changes in the organizational
support and the support required to maintain and update a security toolbox.
The thesis concludes by briefly summarizing the main points. In addition to the
summary, the author explores the topic of centralization of computer security expertise
and the need for further study and consideration of this issue.
xii
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the inception of the ARPANET in the early 1970's, computer networks have
proliferated at a phenomenal pace. From the 1970's until 1987, the number of computer
networks connected to the ARPANET steadily increased to approximately 2(M.
Between 1987 and 1989, the number of networks increased to almost 50M. [QUAR90:
p. 2821 In a span of three years, the number of networks connected to the ARPANET
more than equalled the number from the previous 17 years.
The ARPANET evolved and matured into what is now referred to as the Internet,
which has the potential to interconnect millions of users. [BELS93]I[QUAR90] This
explosion of interconnected computers has significantly increased the availability of
information in the research and academic communities, as well as government
agencies. [KROL93: pp. 11-13] The current pace of hardware and software
improvements will certainly be a driving factor in the increased access to information
provided by these interconnected networks, and if the pace of technological
advancement continues, in the author's opinion, most homes, offices, government
agencies, etc. will be eventually interconnected in a massive array of networks which
can transfer information across numerous system configurations.
In a computing environment as described above, network security will be one of
the more important management issues in the foreseeable future. As technology allows
connectivity between more computers and varieties of networks, the protection of
information and resources will become critical. Vast databases of sensitive information
will be lucrative and attractive targets for attack, presenting challenges in the
management and implementation of information security (INFOSEC).
Unless network security is taken seriously, the competitive advantage needed to
sustain U. S. economic development and military capability could be undermined. A
global information network, using modem technology, will increase the competition
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among industrialized countries and will require more sophisticated techniques to
protect information. Network security will play a vital role in preserving the security
and integrity of sensitive information which must reside in network databases.
In this thesis, the author addresses two aspects of computer security within the
government and DOD in particular. The first area of concern deals with minimizing the
security vulnerability inherent in the administration of unclassified Unix networks,
especially when connected to larger networks like the Internet. The primary method of
improving Unix security in the near term is the concept of implementing a security
toolbox. The second aspect of computer security which will be addressed is the
management role played by the government and possible changes which could be made
to improve security management, expertise, and policy.
The more immediate concern is with the administration of unclassified Unix-based
networks, managed by the government. Unix security vulnerabilities are continually
documented by organizations like the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT)
at Carnegie Mellon University and these vulnerabilities require immediate attention on
the part of government computer security personnel. Unix does have powerful security
features, but the problem arises from either the inexperience, lack of resources, the
addition of programs which undermine security. (See the appendix for an explanation
of some critical Unix security issues.) Networks. operated by the government and its
contractors, pose numerous vulnerabilities with respect to the protection of sensitive
information. Many government-owned Unix networks have gateways to the Internet
and those networks are attractive targets for attack and intrusion.
Recent thesis research, conducted by a computer science graduate student from the
Naval Postgraduate School, demonstrated that some government networks can be
penetrated and exploited with relative ease. [RICH92: pp.2 0 -2 11 Unclassified
government computer systems such as those exploited by Lieutenant Rich are
connected to the Internet, and they are vulnerable to attack by hostile governments or
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criminals. In the author's opinion, the scope of the problem has not yet been
systematically addressed. The government remains primarily in a reactive role as
demonstrated by the creation of CERT after the Internet Worm infected thousands of
host computers, to include many government computers, connected to the Internet.
[DCAC]
Automated security tools are a means to increase the security of Unix networks,
but these tools should be validated and distributed by government security experts and
provided to all managers of government networks. Such tools would assist the
administrators or security managers in evaluating their Unix networks, with the
ultimate goal of improving the security posture of the network. Unix networks are the
primary focus of this paper, but it should be evident that other types of networks may
also come under attack, and require improved security management.
There are several tools which have been developed to address Unix network
security weaknesses and vulnerabilities, and these tools will be discussed later in this
paper. Every network administrator and/or security officer of a Unix system should be
familiar with the security tools presented in the following chapters and incorporate
those tools in a security toolbox. The toolbox should be protected and restricted to only
those personnel involved in network security.
The second aspect of computer security to be addressed in this paper is concerned
with improving the computer security advice and assistance provided to managers of
government networks. As the Department of Defense (DOD) and other government
agencies increase network connectivity to information thoroughfares such as the
Internet, it is essential that computer security policy and management procedures be
reevaluated. The current trends of technological change have been beneficial in many
ways, but the changes often outpace our ability to manage and cope with the new
capabilities.
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The centralization of computer security expertise (for unclassified systems)
should be seriously considered, in light of the significant DOD budget cuts which will
be in effect for several years and the difficulty in developing and maintaining computer
security expertise. Current management of computer security and INFOSEC is carried
out by several organizations, such as the National Security Agency (NSA), the Defense
Information Systems Agency (DISA), and the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), along with other supporting organizations and research
laboratories. What is needed is centralized management of computer security issues. An
organization such as DISA would be a good candidate to provide operational advice,
assistance, and policy guidance to all managers of government computer networks.
Current practice is for each manager of a computer network to look within their own
organization or department for computer security advice and assistance. This method of
dealing with computer security must be reevaluated, because of the proven ability of
technology to keep ahead of security practice and the difficulty in maintaining
computer specialists in government service.
Computer security is proving to be a challenging endeavor as we must attempt to
keep pace with the capability of computer technology, which is providing an almost
constant improvement in access, transfer, and storage of information. The implications
of a lag in security awareness, management, and expertise are not well defined, and
indeed many information technology professionals still resist adhering to security
guidelines. This thesis will attempt to highlight problems and recommend solutions for
Unix networks, as well as propose potential courses of action to improve the





The Internet comprises, by some estimates, from 400 to 6000 networks
located in 100 countries and connecting from one to six million users.[BELS93: p.131
The scope of the Internet is indeed very large and the impact of such an "electronic
village" is significant. The Internet will continue to have far reaching impact in the
development of computer security procedures for the use, processing and storage of
information.
2. History
The Internet began as the ARPANET in the early 1970's. The Advanced
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) provided the funding for an experimental wide area
network which would be used to research the impact of temporary outages on computer
networks, among other topics. The government was interested in how catastrophic
failures or outages could be mitigated in such networks. The initial direction of the
research into network protocols was significantly affected by the underlying
assumption that the network was assumed to be "unreliable". It is understandable,
therefore, why reliability was a major concern in the development of Internet protocols.
Advances in packet switching technology, to include the Internet Protocol (IP) were
possible because of the network research conducted by ARPA. [KROL93: p.11I
The 1980's brought innovative and substantial changes to the ARPANET,
which was considered experime,.al up through 1983. During this period, the
ARPANET architecture had become stable and was also being used for many military
operational purposes. The Department of Defense (DOD) wanted to expand network
connectivity for the military and decided upon the Internet architecture as a good basis
to develop further capability. In 1984, ARPANET was divided into two parts: MILNET
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was created to provide tne military with an unclassified operational computer network,
while ARPANET remained primarily a research and development network.
Concurrent with the changes to the military aspects of the ARPANET, the
National Science Foundation (NSF) began to expand its network capability by adding
five supercomputing centers to the NSFNET, also a part of the ARPANET. The NSF
centers were connected via 56kbps leased telephone lines, facilitating the establishment
of regional networks. An important factor in the maturation of ARPANET was NSF
support of expanded access to the network by educational institutions. NSF promoted
the joining of government and research activities with the academic community.
[KROL93]
The incorporation of non-IP based networks into the ARPANET was also
begun in the 1980's. With the introduction of gateways and routers, more and varied
types of networks were able to communicate with the IP based networks. Networks
such as BITNET and DECNET could then be connected to the ARPANET, expanding
connectivity to other network architectures. [KROL93: pp. 11-13]
The ARPANET was formally disestablished in 1990. Numerous sites which
were part of the ARPANET became part of NSFNET, but the MILNET remained under
administrative direction of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). [DDN:
pp. 9-10] The experimental network that began as the ARPANET evolved into what is
now referred to as the Internet.
The Internet is not a single network or organization, but many networks and
organizations. The NSFNET and MILNET have comprised the backbone of the Internet
because of the high speed links between various regions. The Internet has grown
quickly in recent years and new advances in communications technology will have a
significant impact on future development. The standards of operation for the Internet
are governed by the Internet Architecture Board (IAB), a "...group of invited
volunteers...", which meets periodically to decide on network architecture issues.
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Coordination of the practical network aspects of the Internet is carried out by the
Defense Data Network, Network Information Center (DDN-NIC). [QUAR90: p.279]
The Internet continues to expand as organizations and individuals want more access to
information. Expansion of the Internet will certainly mean increased international
connections in the future, and with expanded access will come the need for more
sophisticated security capability.
B. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTERNET
1. Security and Early Internet Development
The ARPANET began as an experimental network in the days when
mainframe computers were the primary means of computing. Personal computers had
not yet made an impact in the marketplace and computer security was primarily
confined to mainframe operation and control procedures. The explosive developments
in computer hardware and software in the 1980's significantly increased networking
capability, but the new capability also increased vulnerability to illegal or unethical use
of computer systems.
Mainframe/mini-computer systems were the primary research computers in
the 1970's and were developed with auditing and other control mechanisms which
could be used to provide an acceptable degree of security. The nature of mainframe
computing and the investment required for the technology ensured that physical
security and supervision were considered. Connections to computers outside the
organization were the exception rather than the rule. When smaller and more powerful
computers were introduced in the 1980's, security functions were not designed into the
systems. The technology progressed so quickly that operating system software was
standardized before the need for network security was well understood. In the infancy
of personal computer (PC) development, the industry did not know the direction that
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personal computing would take; therefore, security ramifications could not be
predicted. Many commercial companies are now developing systems designed with
security as a major component, and much of this new development has been initiated
and sometimes mandated by the government.
The Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria
(commonly referred to as the Orange Book) is an example of how the government has
attempted to define specific levels of trust for computer systems. The formalization of
such security standards and guidelines has been a necessary step for the continued
development of computer security. The debate on computer and network security issues
will certainly continue as technology continues to provide more capability.
As the computer industry and the Internet have matured, the need for network
security has taken on increased importance. The "electronic villages" of computer
networks now pose a formidable array of security vulnerabilities for the computer
security professional. With more information stored in electronic databases and those
databases being set up to be accessed via computer networks, the importance of
securing sensitive information becomes apparent. [HOLB91: pp. 5-6]
2. Internet Security
Security vulnerability, with respect to the Internet, has not been adequately
addressed if one considers the hardware and software capability which is now available.
The first formal attempt to provide security guidance for Internet users and hosts was
introduced in Request For Comments (RFC) 1244, published in 1991. RFC's are the
means by which the Internet community sets standards and provides information or
guidance. The Site Security Handbook (RFC 1244) is an informational RFC and it is
meant to be used as a guide for improving security on the Internet. [HOLB9 11
RFC 1244 covers a wide variety of topics which impact site security. Topics
such as risk assessment, security policy, physical security, audits, incident handling.
and recovery procedures are discussed. The document is not intended to provide
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specific guidance on security but to provide a basis for developing site security policies
and procedures.[HOLB91: pp. 3-4] The editors of RFC 1244 acknowledged that the
handbook would not be a complete reference; however, in this author's opinion the
overall objective of providing a valuable resource to the Internet community was
certainly achieved.
It is unlikely that strict security procedures will be implemented on the
Internet, due to its scope, size, and complexity. The current trends appear to be
emphasizing Local Area Network (LAN) security, along with increasing the security
capability of routers and gateways. Implementing security for LAN's and points of
connection such as routers and gateways is currently a more realistic goal. Wide Area
Network (WAN) and distributed network security is a more difficult problem, due to
the scope of such networks and the variety of security problems which can be
encountered. Security concerns aside, the Internet will probably be a model for the
"electronic highway" being proposed by the political leadership. Secure protocols may
eventually be implemented on the Internet, but for the foreseeable future it will
primarily be up to the local network constabulary to regulate traffic and maintain
security in their particular area.
C. UNIX AND THE INTERNET
1. Unix Overview
The Unix operating system "...was not designed from the start to be secure. It
was designed with the necessary characteristics to make security serviceable."
[GARF91: p. 8] The statement above indicates the manner in which Unix was
developed, as stated by Dennis Ritchie, one of the original developers. Unix was
designed for the "open" environment of universities and research institutions and was
rewritten in the C programming language during the early 1970's; security was not a
9
critical factor in the development process. The security that was originally included in
Unix was intended more to protect the operating system from being "crashed.-
Another factor affecting Unix is the fact that it was not developed to operate
while connected to outside computer resources such as wide area networks (WAN* s) or
distributed networks. The newer types of networks did not become widely used until
the 1980's. New technologies and the proliferation of high speed communication lines
and networks have significantly altered the environment in which Unix systems must
operate. The threat to Unix based networks will not be substantially diminished in the
near term; therefore, automated security tools and procedures must be used by network
administrators. [GARF91 ]
2. Unix Systems on the Internet
Unix has been a very popular operating system in the academic and research
communities because of its flexibility and capability to communicate. Many of the host
computers on the Internet use some version of the Unix operating system. [GARF91: p.
81 Unix has powerful communication capability, such as remote virtual terminals.
remote file service, electronic mail, electronic directory service, and date/time
verification. Many programs have been added through the years to provide more
capability for Unix based systems. Because of the original design of Unix. security
vulnerabilities are a constant concern when any program is added to the system. (See
the appendix for further amplification.) Indeed, programs have caused serious
vulnerabilities, which in turn have allowed illegal access to those systems which have
not eliminated such vulnerabilities. An example of a program creating a vulnerability is
sendmail. [FERB93] A bug in an early version sendmail program was used by the
Internet Worm to send lines of code to a system debug command. The extra lines of
code created a program which used the system shell to carry out the attack. [FERB93:
pp. 247-248]
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Newer versions of Unix have been developed in recent years, designed with
improved security functionality. Some of the newest versions of Unix have substantial
security capability, from a C2 level (Controlled Access Protection) to a B I level
(Labelled Security Protection). [FERB93: pp. 3, 201-203] Unfortunately, many of the
Unix systems being used are not the newest versions. Older versions of Unix may not
have had software patches added to correct security vulnerabilities, causing many of the
Unix systems in use today will remain a potential security problem for years to come,
until the older systems are eventually phased out and replaced with more sophisticated
versions.
Developers have begun to design secure system software, and future systems
will certainly have much more capability in providing access control, operating kernel
protection, and general auditing functions. [FERB93] In the interim, tools to improve
Unix security have been developed; however, to the author's knowledge there has not
been any concentrated effort to develop a standard "toolbox- of software programs or
a methodology for utilization of a "toolbox". It is essential that administrators use
automated security tools to improve network security and protect sensitive information.




A. COMPUTER SECURITY TRENDS
1. The Security Threat
Does a threat exist? If the number of security incidents on the MILNET is any
indication, then the answer is yes. MILNET security incidents increased from one or
two a month prior to 1988 to several incidents each day, in 1989. The primary causes
of the security incidents were poor system administration and management. Problems
were found in account administration, password administration, and system
configuration. [MADR92: pp. 2-3] The proliferation of powerful personal computers
and sophisticated software have made the security threat much more real. The means to
thwart would be attackers has improved, but advanced technology is available to
anyone, and gaining an advantage in security is a zero sum gain.
The information presented in Table I provides an indication of the trends in
computer attacks and was based on survey information collected in the 1980's. The
overall trends are significant and probably indicative of today's trends. The occurrences
of attacks increased in each category, with the exception of banks. ICUNN90: p. 69]
Table 1: COMPUTER CRIME SUMMARY
Crganization Type 1986 1989
Attack Percentage Attack Percentage
Commercial 23% 36%
Banks 18% 12%
Telecommunication Companies 15% 17%
Government 14% 17C/c
Individuals Not Reported 12%
Universities Not Reported 4%
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Table 2 shows categories of computer threats and the related percentages as
determined by the Datapro Research Corporation report. [CUNN9O: p. 68] The source
of the threat is not necessarily related to the severity of damage caused by that threat.





Human (Outsider): Total 1%-3%




It is reasonable to believe that a majority of computer security and integrity
problems come from employee error or accident. The problem for the future, however.
will be the ever increasing amount of information that resides in computer databases.
Those databases will be more and more attractive as targets of unscrupuious persons.
willing to gain illegal access to a system, for personal gain. Though most of the security
effort may be placed on minimizing errors and accidents, it is important to remember
that a compromise of sensitive information could undermine the organization with only
one incident.
Table 3 indicates the computer security trends in information technology
products from 1985 to 1991. [CUNN90: p. 63] With the exception of anti-virus
products, the top four categories of security technology being put to use are all related
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to access control or protection of information. The trends indicate where the computer
security emphasis has been placed. As anti-virus programs and access control
mechanisms become more automated and reliable, organizations will tend to seek
greater information access via networks. As more network access is required. more
emphasis will be placed on network security.
Table 3: SECURITY TRENDS 1985-1991
PERCENTOF PERCENTOF PERCENTAGE
CATEGORY USERS USERS INCREASE
1985 1991
Anti-Virus Products 1% 53% 5300%
Advanced Encryption 3% 29% 967%
Smart Cards 5% 36% 720%
Secure Networks 10% 61% 610%
Secure Database Systems 11% 57% 518%
Intrusion Detection 8% 31% 388%
Systems
Secure Operating Systems 19% 57% 300%
Audit Analysis Aids 19% 54% 284%
Callback Modems 17% 43% 253%
DES Encryption 19% 47% 247%




Many system administrators today are in the unenviable position of trying to
keep up with normal network administrative duties and network security at the same
time. It is not surprising that security has not been given significant attention, except in
certain government and specialized commercial activity where security is essential for
operation.
In the book, "Unix System Security" by Wood and Kochan, it is




(3) Denial of Service, and
(4) Loss of Integrity.
The administrator must protect the system from damage, which can be caused
by any of the four categories listed above. [WOOD85: p. 102]
Because Unix was not designed to be secure, the network administrator or
security manager has a much greater burden of responsibility. The administrator must
be aware of the fact that the Unix systems in use today must be updated on a regular
basis to patch security loopholes. Security vulnerabilities are reported by the Computer
Emergency Response Team (CERT), once they are found. Maintaining security poses
an additional burden for the administrator, particularly in those organizations that do
not have a dedicated computer security manager. The following quote from The
Hallcrest Report will give some insight into the state of computer security throughout
the 1980's and the challenge for IT professionals in the 1990's: "Most security
managers are presently ill-equipped, personally and organizationally, to counter the
computer security threat, particularly external, electronic intrusion...". [CUNN90: p.
64]
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It is not sufficient for an administrator or security manager to learn the Unix
operating system and its functions, but it is necessary to be aware of new programs
which are added to the system and how they interact with Unix. Any new program
added to the system, has the potential of compromising system security, because the
program may produce security loopholes unforeseen by the developer.
Since Unix can have multiple users and multiple programs all running at the
same time, the potential for security vulnerability and program conflict is significant.
Most versions of Unix do have security capability in the form of access controls, where
groups and individual users can be granted access to specific portions of the system.
The problem arises when security procedures are not followed strictly and improper
access is allowed for programs or users. The powerful functions and capabilities
provided by the Unix operating system can allow attackers to gain superuser (full
system) access if loopholes are not fixed immediately. The potential result of a security
loophole can be complete compromise of the system and/or destruction of data or denial
of service. [GARF91: pp. 8-91
B. UNIX SECURITY EVALUATION TOOLS
An important aspect of using security tools is determining how they can best be
used in combination. Finding the right combination of tools that use up the least amount
of personnel or computer resources is important, especially when these resources are
becoming more costly. This facet of tool utilization will be addressed later, in the
section on developing a security toolbox.
The security tools mentioned below have been in use for a relatively short period
of time, with improvements being added as time and resources were available. Some of
the tools have been developed in the past year and a half, with at least one tool (Ice Pick)
which has not yet been released for use outside of the Naval Research Lab (NRL). The
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veteran security tool for Unix is the COPS collection of programs, which has been
available on the Internet since around 1989.
There are sources of information available on the Internet which provide a
description of each of the tools and what they are designed to do. The intention in this
paper is to summarize the capability of each tool, and highlight the differences and/or
weaknesses of each tool in comparison to each other. It should be noted that the
weaknesses described are meant to focus on areas which should be addressed in the
future, as security tool kits become more mature and powerful. The weaknesses do not
necessarily refer to inadequacy of the current operation of the programs. unless
specifically stated as such.
There is not a "single" source which provides the information presented iin this
paper. One of the main problems with keeping abreast of Unix security tools is the fact
that there is no single repository of security programs and tools. Part of the problem is
the dichotomy between commercial and government developed software. Programs
such as Ice Pick have been developed in a military research facility and are not initially
released to the general public. On the other hand, programs such as COPS [COPS91 ]
were developed in the academic environment and have been freely available to all users
on the Internet for some time.
Though not all of the tools discussed here are available to the general public, they
should be available to most administrators of government Unix systems. The only
exception is Ice Pick, which has not yet been fully developed. The following tool
descriptions will provide additional information on government and non-government
Unix security programs. By providing a comparative listing of capabilities it should be
easier for an administrator to make a more informed decision about which security tools
to acquire. It is expected that anyone using such programs has the necessary training
and the authority to install the tools on their system.
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1. Computer Oracle Password and Security System (COPS)
a. Capability
COPS is a collection of programs which are designed to check various
security aspects of a Unix system. The programs were developed by Dan Farmer and
other contributors to help system administrators find and eliminate security flaws or
vulnerabilities in their systems. Security vulnerabilities are reported to the
administrator, but they are not fixed by the COPS program. The administrator must take
action to correct security problems found by COPS. The programs are very flexible and
can be modified for different systems, but it takes an experienced administrator to be
able to get the most benefit from COPS.
Included in COPS is the Kuang program, developed by Robert W.
Baldwin. Kuang is an expert system which uses rules to determine if the system can be
compromised. The administrator gives the program a goal, such as becoming a super-
user, and the program uses its rules and knowledge of the security mechanisms in Unix
to find out if super-user access can be acquired. [COPS91] [BALD87]
COPS is currently designed to run on most Berkeley Software
Distribution (BSD) and System V versions of Unix. It is also important to note that
many of the security tools developed after COPS have used some of the methodology
and in some cases the actual programs included in the original COPS distribution. The
following list includes some of the more critical checks that are conducted by COPS
(The functionality of critical Unix programs and files mentioned below are explained
in the appendix.):
(1) Permissions for devices, directories, and files.
(2) Password selection.
(3) Checks of the security, tofmat, and content of password files and group files.
(4) Checks files and programs that are run by cron or /etc/rc*.
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(5) Various facets of root-SUID (see the appendix) files, such as writeability or
whether the file is a shell script.
(6) Cyclic Redundancy Checks (CRC) of key files or binaries. The CRC is then used
to detect future changes.
(7) Check writeability of start-up files or home directories.
(8) Check the setup of anonymous File Transfer Protocol (FTP).
(9) Checks for hidden shells and other potential problems such as unrestricted tftp
or SUID uudecode.
(10) Checks various root functions, as well as whether the current directory is in the
search path, whether NFS mounts are unrestricted, if a "+" sign is in the /etc/host.equiv
file. etc.
b. Weaknesses
(1) COPS must be run on a regular basis to detect problems, rather than run as a real-
time monitoring system to alert the administrator of problems as they occur. COPS can
be set up to run automatically at set intervals, but the programs must be configured so
that only changes since the last check are reported.
(2) COPS does not use a Graphical User Interface (GUI). It is a command line
driven program in which the user types the appropriate command to begin execution of
the programs. The administrator must have properly configured the programs to
conduct checks on specific systems. Filters must be set up by the administrator to
eliminate redundant reporting. A GUI would make manipulation of the programs
simpler and easier for an inexperienced administrator to understand.
(3) COPS does not provide a graphical representation (mapping) of the network, to
assist in vulnerability assessment.
(4) No on-line HELP is provided with the COPS package.
19
2. Security Profile Inspector (SPI)
The SPI security tool for Unix was developed under the sponsorship and
technical guidance of several organizations, which included the U.S. Department of
Energy, the U.S. Air Force Cryptologic Support Center, and the Defense Intelligence
Agency. SPI/Unix version 2.1 was released in July 1992, and is currently maintained by the
Computer Security Research Center at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The
main goal of SPI is to assist administrators and security managers in maintaining the
security and integrity of the system. The SPI software performs most of the same functions
as COPS package with some additional functionality, but it was developed wit,. i different
user interface. The primary capabilities and interface modes are listed below:
a. Capability
As an integrated security package, SPI is more functional than COPS,
but this capability requires more hardware resources, such as increased disk space. SPI
substantially incorporates the functions of COPS (including the Kuang program), along
with an integrity checker and an on-line HELP facility. The following capabilities are
provided by SPI/Unix:
(1) SPI/Unix uses a menu type user interface. There are six distinct parts to the
security package, which include the Quick System Profile (QSP), the Access Control
Test (ACT), the Password Security Inspector (PSI), the Binary Inspector Tool (BIT).
the File Inode Change Detector (FCD), and the File Data Change Detector (DCD). The
QSP, ACT, PSI, and BIT portions of the package test for vulnerabilities in the Unix
system. The FCD and DCD portions of the package are used to test for possible
intrusion into the system.
(2) SPI/Unix QSP conducts a set of security checks based on and adapted from the
checks developed for COPS.
(3) SPI/Unix ACT is designed to check for dependencies in access control files used
by Unix. This portion of SPI was adapted from the "Kuang" tool, developed by Bob
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Baldwin. ACT is rule-based and seeks to achieve a goal, such as finding dependencies
that lead to a compromise of root access of the system. Other goals can be requested,
such as gaining write access to a specific file, executing commands as a particular user,
or executing commands as a particular group member.
(4) SPI/Unix PSI is used to check the Unix passwords that do not provide adequate
protection. PSI uses word dictionaries and word permutations to determine if the
password can be easily acquired. Three dictionaries are used to check passwords, which
include commonly used English words, local idiomatic words, and a listing of trivial
words. The local dictionary can be modified to include words specified by the
administrator. PSI will also check for old passwords, which could indicate dormant
accounts, or accounts without passwords.
(5) SPI/Unix BIT checks the system binaries to determine if the most recent
software patches have been installed. The digital signature (RSA MD5) associated with
each critical binary file on the system is computed by BIT. The digital signature is then
compared to a database of signatures which is included in SPI/Unix. The database
consists of digital signatures of critical binary files, to include versions that are known
to be out of date and those that are current. Once the comparison is completed, the
program informs the administrator of the results and makes further recommendations.
if updates are required. It is important to remember that BIT can only check for those
binaries distributed prior to the current version of SPl/Unix.
(6) SPI/Unix FCD checks the inode attributes of system-critical files to determine
if the files have been modified. The attributes checked include checksum, 3ize,
modification time, permissions, number of links, etc. The attributes are checked against
a database originally generated by the administrator by using the "snapshot" function
provided in SPI. The snapshot is acquired during the installation of the SPI package.
The snapshot can also be taken by using the Unix istat program.
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(7) SPI/Unix DCD creates a unique signature for each critical file on the Unix
system. The signature is created by the MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm developed by
RSA Data Security, Inc. A database of the original signatures is acquired during the
installation process. A snapshot of the signatures can also be obtained by using the Unix
sstat program.
(8) From the main menu, the administrator can choose which portion of the SPI
program to use, as well as view output reports, schedule run times, manage parameters
of the system, and check the status of an active process.
(9) The security portions of SPI are run in the background, once chosen from the
main menu. This allows the user to make other selections or conduct other functions
simultaneously.
(10) On-line HELP is provided by the SPI/Unix package.
(11) Like COPS, SPI can be ported to various versions of the Unix operating system.
SPI has been tested on BSD, System V, and Sun OS.
b. Weaknesses
(1) SPI/Unix must be set up to run on a regular basis, rather than run as a real-time
monitoring system to alert the administrator of problems as they occur. SPI can be
configured to run automatically at set intervals.
(2) SPI does not use a Graphical User Interface (GUI). It is a menu driven program
in which the user selects which portion of the program to execute. A GUI would make
manipulation of the programs simpler and easier for the novice to understand.
(3) SPI does not provide a graphical representation of the network, to assist in
vulnerability assessment.
3. Ice Pick
Ice Pick is a security package being developed by Jeff Humphrey, of Kaman
Sciences Corporation, under contract to the Naval Research Laboratory. Ice Pick was
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written to provide a security tool which can be used to find security vulnerabilities and
attempt to compromise system security. The package consists of a testing daemon
(program) and an interface program. Ice Pick can be used to test the security of a system by
attacking portions of the system and attempting to find security flaws.
The testing daemon will try to compromise security on the target system, and
then report the results to the interface program which can provide a report of the test results.
Ice Pick should be used in conjunction with other security tools. For example, COPS or SPI
can be used to find potential vulnerabilities. After appropriate corrective actions have been
taken, Ice Pick can be used to verify that the corrective actions were effective. Ice Pick
cannot prove that a system is secure, but it can help in assessing system vulnerabi! ries and
provide a measure of confidence in the system's overall security posture.
The current version of Ice Pick is primarily designed to test for known operating
system vulnerabilities. The package is being developed with the assumption that additional
testing modules will be added to the package, to increase the overall effectiveness of the
tool.
a. Capability
(1) The program tests the security and configuration of the following system
functions: ftp, E-mail, tftp, export of file systems, X-windows, system command
interfaces, remote network connections, privileged accounts, communications sockets
and links, networking applications, and security monitoring stations.
(2) The program keeps detailed logs of its activity, as well as logs of past testing
information.
(3) Testing can be conducted at varied levels, from level 1 which checks for known
system vulnerabilities, to level 7 which attempts to compromise the system.
(4) The package uses X Windows, providing a Graphical User Interface to
manipulate the program.
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(5) A visual representation of network nodes can be displayed on the screen, with
color coding for system status.
b. Weaknesses
(1) Ice Pick is not yet fully developed and has not been tested by computer security
professionals outside of NRL.
(2) Full documentation and code is not yet available.
4. Tripwire
Tripwire is a security tool developed at the Purdue Research Foundation of
Purdue University, by Gene Kim and Gene Spafford. The primary purpose of the software
is to verify the integrity of critical system files residing on a variety of Unix systems. The
integrity of a file is checked by creating a digital signature of the file and comparing the
signature with a stored version of the signature. A system administrator who has properly
set up Tripwire can use the security tool to ensure that an attacker has not changed any
critical files on the system.
Several types of digital signatures can be created by Tripwire. The signature
algorithms used in Tripwire include MD5, Snefru, MD4, MD2, CRC-32, and CRC- 16. The
first four algorithms are cryptographic algorithms, also referred to as message digests or
one-way hash functions. The cryptographic technique is used to ensure that any change to
the original file creates a vastly different signature. By using a 128 bit signature, these
algorithms are quite difficult, if not impossible to break in any reasunable length of time.
The last two algorithms, CRC-32 and CRC-16, generate checksums using polynomial
division. This method is significantly less secure than the cryptographic algorithms, but
much faster.
The developers of Tripwire recommend that MD5 and Snefru both be used to
create a digital signature of each critical file. Both signatures should be used in combination
to verify file integrity. By using two signatures, it would be almost inconceivable that a file
could be altered in any way and not change the signature.
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a. Capability
(1) Tripwife can be configured to run automatically at set intervals, but it must be
run on a regular basis to be effective.
(2) The algorithms used by Tripwire give a very strong assurance that file integrity
is maintained. If properly configured, it would be virtually impossible for an attacker to
alter files on the system, without being detected.
(3) Tripwire is able to send results of its integrity checks to the system administrator
via mail.
(4) Tripwire is very flexible and can be setup to create various combinations of
signatures, as required. The capability also comes at the price of requiring a relatively
skilled administrator.
b. Weaknesses
(1) Tripwire must be configured to run on a regular basis, rather than run as a real-
time monitoring system to alert the administrator of problems as they occur.
(2) Tripwire does not use a Graphical User Interface (GUI). It is a command-line
driven program. A GUI would make manipulation of the program simpler and easier for
an inexperienced administrator to understand.
(3) An experienced system administrator is needed to understand which files should
be checked and at what regularity. Though Tripwire is very flexible, it must be
configured properly in order to provide a sufficient level of protection.
(4) Execution time of the cryptographic algorithms can be quite lengthy, using
valuable CPU time.
5. TCP Wrapper
TCP Wrapper is a program developed by Wietse Venema of Eindhoven
University of Technology in the Netherlands. The program is designed to intercept requests
for Internet services such as telnet, finger, ftp. exec, rsh, rlogin, tftp, talk, comsat, and other
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services. Once the request is intercepted, TCP Wrapper logs in pertinent information such
as the name of the remote host, the name of the service which was requested, and a time
stamp. After recording the information, the program can verify tf-- validity of the request
before passing it on to the appropriate server.
a. Capability
(1) TCP Wrapper uses the Unix syslog facility to log information.
(2) The log information can be used to document activity should an attacker attempt
to compromise the system.
(3) The program has some capability to detect if a host computer is trying to use
another hosts name to spoof the system into providing services. If spoofing is detected.
TCP Wrapper can drop the connection to the suspect host.
b. Weaknesses
(1) The administrator must tailor the information provided by TCP Wrapper so that
the sheer volume of information is not so overwhelming that it obscures suspicious
activity.
(2) In a large network, many servers may have to provide service to other Internet
hosts. In this case, TCP Wrapper must be placed on any server which is required to
respond to Internet service requests. The administrator must configure the network so
that TCP Wrapper is a value-added addition and not an inefficient use of computer
resources. Minimizing the number of servers can help in this regard.
6. Crack
Crack is a program written by Alec D. E. Muffett, a Unix Software Engineer in
Aberystwyth, Wales, United Kingdom. It is currently in its fovrth version and has been
used extensively by system administrators and others to crack the encrypted passwords
stored in the Unix system. The program takes the Unix password file and produces a sorted
list. The list from the password file is scanned for useful information and that information
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is merged with dictionaries of words supplied in the program. The merged data is then used
to generate passwords to compare with the passwords residing in the password file. Several
passes are made over the password file -- on rules specified in the Crack program, and
any match to a password is saved and reported. [MUFF921
Crack is a useful program to check for easily guessed passwords, but it would be
much more preferable to have a program to check, in real time, each password as it is
assigned to determine if it meets secure criteria. There have been some recent programs
written to assist administrators in the task of assigning secure passwords, by ensuring easily
guessed passwords are not chosen by a user. One such program is Passwd+, written by
Matt Bishop. Programs such as Passwd+ can check for an appropriate password length, a
proper combination of characters and numbers, or compare the password against a
dictionary of easily guessed passwords. Once users understand the importance of choosing
and using secure passwords, utilization of the programs like Crack and Passwd+ could
become an extinct practice.
a. Capability
(1) Crack has the ability to spread the workload of cracking passwords ovcr several
machines on a network. This ability can significantly reduce the amount of time needed
to try the various diction..ries and rules.
(2) Dictionaries can be added to Crack as necessary.
(3) The program is self-installing.
(4) The program can send a warning to a user whose password has been cracked, as
well as to the administrator.
b. Weaknesses
(1) Crack must be run on a periodic basis to be effecti~e. A capability to run
continuously in the background, checking newly assigned passwords, would be
beneficial.
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(2) Crack does not use a Graphical User Interface (GUI). It is a command-line
driven program. A GUI would make manipulation of the program simpler and easier for
an inexperienced administrator to understand.
(3) An experienced system administrator is needed to understand how best to use
Crack to improve overall password security on the system.
(4) Utilization of Crack can consume a significant amount of system resources, with
the execution time being directly related to the configuration specified by the





Perhaps one of the most important problems facing the information systems
manager is the general lack of training and expertise in computer security. Network
administrators are often required to learn their duties on the job, with little formal
training in computer security. Information reported by the National Center for
Computer Crime Data (NCCCD) indicated that in 1989 over 50% of personnel working
in the computer field either had not received computer security training or they had
learned about security on the job. The NCCCD information was derived from surveys
of members of the Data Processing Management Association (DPMA). ICUNN90: p.
761
One of the primary reasons for lack of support in computer security is a general
lack of expertise. The lack of security expertise can in part be attributed to the rapidity
of changes in technology, but as previously explained, the government has not been
able to provide incentives to attract enough computer science/security specialists.
ICONG89I Computer security curriculums in U. S. academic institutions are still in
their infancy. Many of the computer security professionals today have gained their
expertise through on-the-job experience and not through extensive formal education.
The shortfall of computer security education is simply another manifestation of the
general lack of computer science training in DOD, which was recognized as a problem
in 1983. The following statements describe the state of computer science training, and
should sound very familiar; in fact, a 1989 congressional report cited continued
problems in computer science [CONG891:
...The Department of Defense, and certainly the entire Federal government is
inundated with computers. As both technology and computer system uses and
techniques expanded, the training and education programs stagnated: in fact, many of
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the programs were reduced in length to save money. Two problems continue to plague
the computer science field: neither training nor the specialists have kept pace with the
technology evolution. [HEDG83: p. 261
Undergraduate computer science education in the United States has problems --
serious ones -- which must be fixed... [Clomputer science research is already
underfunded, both in absolute terms and in comparison to other scientific disciplines.
[CONG89: p. 231
The government does not yet offer a viable career path for computer specialists
(to include security professionals) nor adequate salaries as compared to the privatcz
sector. [CONG89] Based on the difficulty of attracting computer professionals to
government service, it is essential that the government, with the leadership of DOD,
make maximum use of its computer security expertise and obtain the necessary amount
of expertise. A study of the proper allocation of computer security functions, between
centralized and decentralized operations, could provide a comprehensive and flexible
program. But where should the expertise reside? In an era of downsizing in the military,
it is difficult to create new organizations, but it is critical that scarce resources be used
in as efficient a manner as possible.
From an organizational perspective, it is essential that the top level management
be convinced of the necessity to provide resources, in personnel, funding, maintenance,
and improvement of network security. Without organizational support for computer
security, it will be difficult to maintain security of information, accessible via computer
networks. In recent years, there have been significant changes in how the government
manages computer security issues. Some changes have evolved from the original
charter of organizations like NSA (as modified by NSDD 145), but other changes have
occurred because of catastrophic events such as the Internet Worm, which affected over
6,000 host computers on the MILNET and Internet. [DCAC: p. 2-1]
The nature of military and government operations requires that sensitive
unclassified information be stored and processed, and such information will need
greater protection in the future. Sensitive unclassified information now resides in
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computer databases and those databases have not been given the amount of attention
and resources that have been provided for the protection of classified information.
Proper handling of sensitive unclassified information stored on computer networks will
require a significant amount of training in computer security procedures.
The support organizations mentioned below have taken on additional
responsibilities as the need for computer security has increased. Computer security
issues are being addressed, but it is necessary to think about ways to improve on the
disparate organizational structures and security standards in general.
B. SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS
Today. there are a number of government organizations which are tasked to
provide computer security assistance. The quality of the services they provide and the
consistency of the information promulgated by these organizations is greatly impacted
by funding and staffing constraints, as well as the degree of coordination with other
computer security professionals. There is a great deal of computer security expertise
scattered throughout these organizations, but in the author's opinion, there is a
duplication of effort which stems from decentralized management of scarce computer
security resources.
Based on the amount of resources required to maintain security expertise in
information technology, it would seem that the computer security resources could be
better utilized in a centralized structure. Centralization would require a great deal of
inter-agency cooperation, but the payoff could be substantial. By using a single
organization as the focal point, managers of computer networks would be able to get the
benefit of an extensive corporate knowledge base, coupled with tools and advisory
resources to improve security.
To highlight the disparate government authorities involved in computer/
information security today, a brief explanation of several organizations is provided
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below. The organizations are all involved in some aspect of computer security and
provide an indication of where computer security resources reside in the government.
I. Computer Emergency Response Team/Coordination Center (CERT/CC)
The Computer Emergency Response Team/Coordination Center (CERT/CC)
is located at Carnegie Mellon University. The CERT/CC was created by funding from
DARPA in December 1988. The impetus for creating the organization was the Internet
Worm, which was unleashed by Robert Morris Jr. in November 1988. The worm
effectively brought down thousands of computers. Many computers crashed because of
the worm, and others simply stopped functioning properly. Some administrators
disconnected their computers from the Internet, because of the paucity of information
concerning protective measures in the early hours after the worm's release. [KEHO921
The CERT/CC was formed to fill a hole in the dissemination of information
and monitoring of security related incidents. It is a civilian organization with no
regulatory powers and its major function is to act as a central point of contact for
government and civilian organizations to report security incidents, primarily on the
Internet. The CERT/CC also promulgates information concerning security holes found
in operating systems and other security related issues. One of the additional services
that the CERT/CC provides is the coordination of the CERT TOOLS mailing list. The
mailing list is used to promulgate information about security evaluation tools being
developed or currently in use by administrators and security practitioners. [GARF91J
[HOLB91]
2. Computer Incident Advisory Capability (CIAC)
The Department of Energy (DOE) Computer Incident Advisory Capability
(CIAC) is located at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The CIAC consists of
four computer scientists, who must provide assistance for all types of computer security
incidents. The CIAC is expected to provide assistance on a 24-hour basis, if needed. It
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must also coordinate security incidents with the emergency response teams of other
organizations.
Many of the duties performed by the CIAC mirror those types of duties
performed by the CERT/CC; however, the CIAC is primarily responsible for providing
computer security expertise for Department of Energy sites. CIAC is also responsible
for providing technical assistance to DOE subordinate organizations. The charter of the
CIAC encompasses giving advice and assistance on all aspects of computer security as
it relates to the DOE. Such a charter is a large responsibility for an organization the size
of CIAC and underscores the necessity for tight coordination with other agencies.
[GARF91 ] [HOLB91]
3. Computer Network Security Response Team (CNSRT)
The NASA Ames Research Center Computer Network Security Response
Team (CNSRT) is similar to the CERT/CC, but it is responsible for providing a
computer security focal point within NASA Ames. Created in 1989, the CNSRT
coordinates its activity with the response teams of other organizations. It has provided
assistance to other federal agencies, but its primary responsibility continues to be for
computer security issues within NASA Ames. [HOLB91 ]
4. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)
The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), originally the Defense
Communications Agency (DCA), was renamed in 1991. The organization is now in the
midst of reorganization due to the downsizing of the military and consolidation of
various aspects of information management in DOD. DISA has numerous
responsibilities, of which management of DDN secu:ity and operations is but one small
portion. There is currently an organization within DISA, the Defense Information
Systems Security Program (DISSP), that is also in the process of defining its role in
information systems security (INFOSEC) in DOD. The downsizing of DOD will cause
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some amount of instability in organizations such as DISA as they attempt to reorganize
for more efficient utilization of assets. DISA is not yet the major contributor in
computer security research and expertise, except through its management of DDN.
DISA will be required to coordinate with the National Security Agency (NSA) to clarify
it role in INFOSEC. NSDD 145 gives the INFOSEC responsibility to NSA, but a key
question will be how an organization as large as DISA should fit into INFOSEC
management once it is reorganized and consolidated.
5. National Computer Security Center (NCSC)
The NCSC is located near Linthicum, Md. and is an organization of the
National Security Agency (NSA). It was established in 1981, as the DOD Computer
Security Evaluation Center with a name change to the NCSC in 1985. One of the
primary goals of the NCSC is to encourage and provide assistance in making trusted
Automated Information Systems (AIS) available for organizations processing classified
information. The NCSC has played a key role in developing standards of trust for
computer systems. This role is closely aligned to that of NIST which deals with
standards for unclassified systems. Through the years there has been much discussion
on how the two organizations should coordinate their activity on developing standards
in computer security. [DOD85]
6. National Institute Of Standards And Technology (NIST)
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Computer
Security Resource and Response Center (CSRC) is located in Gaithersburg. Md. The
primary mission of NIST is to develop security standards for organizations outside of
DOD. NIST was involved with the creation of the CERT/CC in 1988, and has continued
their involvement in the development of emhergency response capability. NIST has its
own 24-hour capability which is provided by the CSRC. Its goal is to provide a point of
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contact for computer security related information. It operates a computer bulletin board
system (BBS) to promulgate computer security information.
NIST also is involved with developing methodologies for computer security
evaluation. These tasks are duplicated to some extent by the National Computer
Security Center (NCSC), a subordinate organization of the National Security Agency.
NIST has provided publications for access via the Internet, and organizations with
Internet access can download several publications which deal with computer viruses or
computer security. [GARF91] [HOLB91] [CONG91]
7. National Security Agency (NSA)
NSA is primarily responsible for Signals Intelligence activity of the
government, for the purpose of collecting and processing national foreign intelligence;
however, another important aspect of the NSA charter is its designation as the National
Manager for Telecommunications and Ajtomated Information Systems Security,
which was stipulated in National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 145 of 1984. In
order to carry out its function under NSDD 145, NSA reorganized its communications
security (COMSEC) and computer security (COMPUSEC) divisions into a
consolidated information security (INFOSEC) division. NSA's responsibility was also
broadened to include unclassified and national security sensitive information, where
previously it had been concerned with classified information almost exclusively. With
NSDD 145, NSA assumed duties as the government focal point for cryptography.
telecommunications systems security, and automated information systems security.
[NSDD84]
C. THE FUTURE
In the author's opinion, DOD must be willing to assume a flexible and innovative
leadership role, so that establishing a central focal point for operational level computer
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security issues can become a reality. Changes in communication culture will require
significant investment in computer security, primarily because the technology has
progressed so fast that the implications of such change are difficult to predict. People
understand the need for police and other forms of law enforcement, but the protection
of the value and privacy of vast databases of unclassified sensitive information is an
intangible need which is difficult to articulate. Without adequate protection, however,
information critical to the economy and technological development will be exploited by
those governments wishing to gain a competitive advantage based on the capital
investment of the U.S.
Establishing a central authority for computer security support will allow the
military services to coordinate the use of computer security techniques and tools.
Centralization is not a new idea, but it has been consistently resisted by the military
services. The Defense Management Report Decision (DMRD) 918, signed in 1992.,
directed the consolidation of IT under the auspices of DISA. The pace of the
consolidation has slowed in 1993 and the military services have objected to how the
consolidation is being executed. Part of the consolidation will include INFOSEC, but
this particular aspect of the reorganization is in a evolutionary stage, with NSA
remaining as the primary authority. [NSDD84]
It is particularly essential that the military services recognize the need for a central
focal point for computer security issues. The services may need to reassign personnel
to create such an organization, but if organized properly, the long term benefit should
surpass the loss in personnel resources. The ability of each of the military services to
keep up with technological innovations is impaired because they cannot dedicate
enough resources to maintain expertise.
Without wise management of security today, the losses sustained by not
adequately controlling sensitive information could potentially undermine national
security and/or technological competitiveness. The outcome of competitive economics
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or future militay conflicts will depend on protecting the technological frontiers and
managing information wisely. Computer security will be critical to this goal.
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V. THE SECURITY TOOLBOX
A. SOFTWARE TOOLS
Unix accommodates networking as an integral part of the system capability.
Unfortunately, it takes an experienced Unix system administrator to deal with potential
security vulnerabilities associated with Unix. The operating system is very large and
complex, and since many system administrators are assigned to the duties with little or no
formal training, it is essential that security tools be made available to assist the
administrator. [CUNN90]
Several security tools were presented in the last chapter, including Ice Pick, a new
tool being developed by the Naval Research Laboratory. These tools were developed
because of a growing perception that effectively managing Unix security in a network
environment requires the use of automated methods to keep track of system security.
Automated security checks will be essential as system complexity increases and as
increasing amounts of sensitive and valuable information is stored in computers. When
those computers operate in a network, the potential for an attack increases.
Technology continues to improve our capability to manage and store information, but
our methods of securing the information has lagged behind. The skill required to protect
information on computer networks is much greater than for the traditional security
concerns such as physical security. Before the advent of computer networks, physical
protection of resources was the most prominent requirement. The new threat today is the
accessibility of vast databases of information which can be exploited remotely, by an
attacker. This type of vulnerability is certainly not ignored by hostile governments, as
demonstrated in recent years by the arrests of computer crackers in Europe, caught illegally
accessing U. S. government computer systems.
The need for a dedicated organization focusing specifically on computer security
issues was underscored by the infamous Internet Worm incident. The Internet Worm was
released by Robert T. Morris on November 2, 1988 and subsequently, the Computer
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Emergency Response Team/Coordination Center (CERT/CC) at Carnegie Mellon
University was established in the same year. The threat demonstrated by the Internet Worm
was the catalyst for creating the CERT/CC. [FERB93: p. 2411 [HOLB9gl [SPAF881 The
CERT/CC began operating in December 1988 with funding from the Defense Research
Projects Agency (DARPA). The primary goal of the CERT/CC has been to serve as a
principal point of contact for computer security incident reporting. [HOLB91: pp. 43-44]
The effectiveness of an organization such as CERT/CC demonstrates how good
coordination can be achieved through centralization of computer security expertise.
As the CERT/CC has matured, it recognized the need for automated security tools
and started the CERT TOOLS mailing list in 1992. The mailing list serves to facilitate the
exchange of information on security tools. The CERT/CC does not have the resources to
evaluate and/or endorse particular security tools, therefore, it is up to individual system
administrators to select, install, and evaluate these tools. This assumes, of course, that these
administrators possess the requisite skills necessary to assess the tool's effectiveness.
What is needed by each administrator of a Unix network is a Security Toolbox which
has been evaluated by security professionals. Until such formal procedures are established
to address security tool evaluation, the administrator's toolbox should include, at a
minimum, the programs discussed in this paper. Other programs should be added as well,
such as a program to check passwords as they are assigned to the user.
One of the major problems with maintaining a security toolbox will be the fact that
there is no recognized central authority which has evaluated and tested the effectiveness of





A system administrator who has a thorough understanding of his or her specific
system is essential to developing and maintaining a secure network. Formal training
specific to an organization's configuration and experience on similar systems should be a
primary criteria prior to hiring or selecting the system administrator. 1n addition, formal
systems security training is desirable. If formal training is unavailable, it is essential that
the administrator attend any computer security conferences, seminars, or workshops that
are offered. Conferences are held in various locations throughout the U.S. and are
frequently announced in security related articles posted on Internet newsgroups.
An administrator can and should keep abreast of computer security related issues
by subscribing to appropriate Internet newsgroups and mailings. A listing of several










Mailing lists are often announced on the newsgroups, along with procedures to
get added to the list. An example of a mailing list would be the CERT TOOLS list
mentioned earlier. This list is controlled by CERT, and it is restricted to administrators and
other personnel with a legitimate interest in computer security.
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2. Organizational Support
There are several organizations which provide excellent support in the area of
computer security. The following organizations are some of the principal organizations
involved with computer security issues: Computer Emergency Response Team/
Coordination Center (CERT/CC) at Carnegie Mellon Univesity; Defense Information
Systems Agency (DISA), oepartment of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability
iCIAC) at Lawrer.,-'e Livermore National Laboratory; NASA Ames Computer Network
Security Respinse Team (CNSRT); National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) Computer Security Resource and Response Center in Gaithersburg, Maryland.; and
the National Security Agency (NSA) in Ft. Meade. Maryland. [HOLB91: pp. 43-
461[NSDD841
3. Security Tool Installation
Once an administrator has acquired security training and knows who to contact
with security questions, the next step is to obtain the necessary security tools and install
them on their system. The administrator should determine which organizations retain the
appropriate security tools and use the "anonymous ftp" capability to transfer the tools to
their system. Those tools that cannot be obtained via the Internet should be requested via
mail or other means.
After acquiring the appropriate tools, the administrator will most probably need
to compile them on the system where they will be used. This process can require some
expertise in changing default parameters before compilation. Since there are currently no
comprehensive tools which can perform all necessary security functions, a skilled
administrator is required for installation and proper configuration of the tools. Care must
be taken to install the tools properly, so that the process of installation does not
inadvertently create additional security vulnerabilities. For instance, accidentally installing
a tool in arn unprotected portion of the system can produce a scrious security breach of the
system and defeat the very purpose for which the tool was designed.
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4. Security Tool Utilization
a. Conducting a Baseline Snapshot
The first and most critical ;wtion that a system administrator can take is
to ensure that original copies of the system software remain un-modified. Next, the
administrator must verify that the installed system software has not been modified. This
may necessitate reinstallation of the system software from the original write-protected
disks or tapes.
Once a "clean" system has been confirmed, a snapshot of all critical files
should be stored in a secure location which is inaccessible to unauthorized personnel.
To make a snapshot, the administrator can use either the SPI/Unix security package or
the Tripwire program. The SPI/Unix package uses MD5 to create a digital signature. If
more security is required, then Tripwire should be used, since it can use more than one
type of signature in combination, to verify critical files.
Taking a snapshot of system files, in conjunction with good backup
procedures, is well worth the investment in time and money. It only takes one
compromise of system security to crash a system, but good security practices will
ensure the system is back up in a timely fashion.
b. Initial Security Checking
Once the operating system has been installed, verified, and a snapshot
taken, the next step is to check various aspects of the system for known vulnerabilities.
Either SPI/Unix or COPS should be used for this procedure. If there is adequate
memory and computing power available, SPI/Unix is the preferred choice. SPI offers a
comprehensive security package in a single tool. Furthermore, since it is a menu driven
tool, it is a bit more user friendly. SPI/Unix does require significantly more memory and
disk space which may pose a problem on smaller systems. On smaller systems, COPS
would be a more logical choice.
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Once the tool has been installed and the system has been checked, the
administrator should decide what types of checks should be made and the periodicity
required in order to best maintain a secure system. The regularity of checks will most
likely be affected by system configuration, storage capability, sensitivity of operations,
and other factors which must be determined by the individual administrator.
Consideration must also be given to how the security information will be archived.
when it is collected. Once archived, physical security of the archives is a significant
issue. If not secured properly, the archive could be stolen by unauthorized personnel
and used to compromise the system.
c. Password Checking
The policy of password selection and assignment could arguably be the
most important issue for a system administrator. Good password management can
thwart many potential security problems. Good password selection can virtually
eliminate the threat of anyone guessing a user's password. It is essential that system
administrators instruct their users on the proper selection of passwords, the importance
of safeguarding the passwords, and user responsibilities.
The key point is that an administrator must strive to maintain a policy
which requires minimum standards of password selection and use. Recommended
methods of password selection have been well documented; but there have been
password programs developed to check passwords. Programs such as Passwd+,
developed by Dr. Matt Bishop, can replace the /bin/passwd program on a Unix system.
The program is designed to discourage selection of a weak password. [REIN93I
Without an automated program to check passwords, it is up to the administrator to
maintain a strong policy. Password policy information can be obtained from the
Department of Defense Password Management Guideline. The guideline recommends
strict policies, such as: using machine generated passwords, audit reports for users and
administrators, and the ability for users to change their own password. [DOD85A]
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d. Monitoring On-Going Activity
After the initial security checks have been conducted and an effective
password selection policy is in place, the TCP Wrapper program should be configured
to monitor on-going activity. The program will monitor vulnerable network functions
like ftp, telnet, finger, tftp, etc. and record activity involving those aspects of the system.
The program should be configured so that it detects host computers trying to use another
host's name. Attempts of this nature should be logged and the connection immediately
dropped. Logs of all activity should be stored in a protected archive. Consideration must
be given about how much of the information is needed for archive purposes, since TCP
often generates a large volume of information. The administrator can also set up
methods to search the logs for suspicious activity. For example, a script file using the
grep program can be used to search for key words or phrases. These activities can then
be analyzed in more depth in order to ascertain if the system has actually been
compromised.
Logs can provide critical information if a compromise of the system is
encountered. Reconstruction of activity surrounding a successful attack can help the
administrator find out how the compromise was accomplished, so that patches can be
developed to thwart future attacks. Furthermore, these logs are critical pieces of
evidence which may be used to prosecute attackers.
e. Active Security Checking
Ice Pick is an active program for testing network security. It is a different
type of tool and should be managed differently. Ice Pick actively tries to compromise
the security of a target system and reports the results to the security manager or
administrator, as required. Such a program is essential in finding security weaknesses
in the computer networks of an organization, but the program must be strictly controlled
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and not released to the general public. A program of this nature could be used by an
attacker to launch automated attacks on any system connected to the Internet.
The best role for a program like Ice Pick is in providing a means to test
the security of multiple systems on a network. An organization's security manager
would need to coordinate active security testing with the system administrators. If the
program is able to compromise a system, procedures must be in place to immediately
correct the vulnerability. A primary goal is to use Ice Pick as a tool to assist network
administrators in keeping each network secure and improving security practices on the
network, Ice Pick can be used to target systems on a regular basis and report the results,
providing a feedback mechanism for the administrator. This method of security testing,
if used properly, can improve the security posture of the organization and instill an
increased awareness of the importance of security.
C. MAINTAINING THE TOOLBOX
It is this author's opinion that DOD should be in the forefront of developing
computer security tools and techniques. One particular area in which DOD should take
a leading role is in the development and maintenance of security toolboxes for
networked systems. This paper addresses the need for a toolbox to sunport Unix
networks only, but the ultimate goal within DOD should be the development of a
separate toolbox for each major system. If development of a toolbox for each system is
not possible, then consideration must be given to minimizing the types of network
systems allowed.
Even though the National Security Agency is responsible for development of
secure network architectures, the reality is that it will be several years until all
unclassified networks are replaced with newer and more secure implementations. A
failure to encourage a toolbox standard will degrade network security and hinder efforts
to protect sensitive information residing in distributed databases. Responsibility for
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maintaining security toolboxes should be given to an organization such as the Defense
Information Systems Agency (DISA); specifically, the Defense Information Systems
Security Program (DISSP) branch of DISA. DISSP seems like a logical choice for the
consolidation of computer security tools and expertise within DOD.
Tools should be acquired, evaluated, and managed by dedicated personnel who
understand security issues and how these tools can assist the administrator or security
officer. The acquisition and maintenance of security tools will require close liaison with
all government and commercial computer security organizations in order to provide the
highest quality services and products. Once tools are obtained and evaluated, they
should be placed on a secure system, which can be accessed via the Internet or a bulletin
board, so that administrators can obtain the tools with the assurance that they have not
been altered by unauthorized personnel. Use of a public key cryptographic system
would be one method of distributing the tools to authorized administrators. A key
element in maintaining a toolbox is that DOD administrators should be able to use
DISSP as a central point of contact for computer security related tools, software, advice,
and assistance.
To indicate the critical importance of security tools, one need only look again to
the Internet Worm incident. The worm was detected soon after it was released, but it
took quite a while before the code was analyzed and the method of attack was known.
The worm used a password attack mechanism within the code as the means to gain
access to vulnerable systems. Had all system administrators used a security toolbox
containing programs to enforce strict password policy, ensure good password selection,
and close known security holes, the damage caused by the Internet worm would have
significantly decreased. Investment in the time and resources to maintain a security
toolbox is cost effective. When deciding to implement a security toolbox such as that
advocated in this paper, it should be remembered that the cost of recovering from just
one incident like the Internet Worm was estimated from $20() to $53,MO() at those
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installations that were affected. Higher estimates for recovery have been approximated
for incidents involving malicious viruses. [REYN89] [KEHO92]
A closely related issue to the establishment and maintenance of a security toolbox
is the control of those tools. Tools must be freely available for personnel involved in
system administration, security, or integrity, but those personnel should realize that
unscrupulous persons can also gain access to many of the same tools. Only by proper
use of security tools and strict configuration control can attacks be mitigated or
rendered ineffective. Passive tools such as COPS, SPI, Tripwire, TCP Wrapper,
Passwd+, etc. provide information on system vulnerabilities that can ensure significant
protection, if those vulnerabilities are corrected. Control and protection of passive tools
is necessary, but controlling access to active tools is of an even greater concern.
Control of active security tools, such as Ice Pick, must be carefully considered,
since these tools can be used in direct attempts to compromise some portion of a system.
The results of the program feedback can immediately be used for illicit purposes. Such
tools should not be freely distributed, due to the potential harm that could be caused by
an attacker using the tool. It would be reasonable for a security organization to retain
control of active tools and conduct system penetration operations remotely from a
secure location. It is important that any holes found in the target system be immediately
closed, since the information would probably be reported over a non-secure
communications channel. An alternative method is to use a laptop computer and
connect directly to the system to be tested. Security specialists could then travel to the
site and test the system without the concern of broadcasting security holes found by an
active tool.
Maintaining security toolboxes and providing advice and assistance is a critical
need for protection of sensitive information collected, stored, and used by the
government. Managers of computer networks need a single point of contact from which
to obtain consistent guidance and new security tools. A single organization should be
47
responsible for providing computer security expertise. This does not preclude
development of a "virtual computer security organization" once distributed computing
is more widespread, but security implications brought on by rapid technological
changes cannot be dealt with independently within each government organization. This




In the author's opinion, the critical nature of computer security, with respect to
actual operations and procedures in the field, has not been dealt with adequately. There
are good reasons for this lack of impact at the operational level. Recent advances in
technology and proliferation of interconnected computer networks continue to
challenge our ability to keep sensitive information secure. DOD, and NSA particularly,
has been primarily interested in the protection of classified information for many years,
but the capability to connect virtually every organization via computer network is
introducing significant security concerns. Once organizations are interconnected, the
key issue becomes one of the protection of sensitive unclassified information residing
in the various databases. The future will bring a continued transition from older forms
of communications to massive computer networks carrying electronic mail, text files,
video, audio, and any combination of those forms of communication, and without some
sort of central clearing house for computer security, the ability to respond to changes in
technology will be degraded.
Computer security in the future will be problematic at best, but security will be
virtually impossible if the investment in new security techniques is not increased.
Maintaining an up-to-date security toolbox will be critical in responding to attacks or in
preventing compromise of a computer network. It is the author's opinion that without
the organizational capability fnr eviluating security tools and providing access to those
tools, administrators will not be able to keep up with new security threats and methods
to protect their system. The proliferation of computer networks will only increase in the
future, and attomated tools will be the only means available to protect information in
organizations which have limited resources. The author believes that through
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centralizing much of DOD's computer security expertise and by using automated
security tools, a greater return on investment can be achieved; however, this
recommendation should be studied in more detail before action is taken.
The first goal of this thesis has been to emphasize security problems associated
with government-owned Unix networks and present a recommended solution for
enhancing the security of those unclassified Unix networks. The secondary goal has
been to give an overview of the various organizations which are responsible for
different aspects of computer security, and recommend changes which can facilitate
expanded access to computer security technology and expertise. The two aspects of this
thesis are closely related, and success in one depends on the other. Two of the key
problems highlighted by the thesis and the recommended solutions are capsulized
below:
PROBLEM:
The utilization of Unix networks to manipulate and store unclassified sensitive
information poses a significant problem for administrators and security officers. The
problem is the most critical on those systems connected to the Internet.
RECOMMENDED SOLUTION:
The creation of a security toolbox is recommended. The toolbox should contain
automated security tools which will assist the Unix administrator and security officer in
ensuring network integrity and security. The automated tools proposed for the initial
version of the toolbox include COPS. SPI/Unix, Ice Pick, Tripwire, TCP Wrapper, and
Crack.
PROBLEM:
There is no management function or coordination method within the government
that maintains and validates automated security tools. Also missing is a function or
coordination method that provides consistent advice and guidance on computer security
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problems. The government organizations involved in computer security provide a vital
function, but the scarce resources are scattered throughout various departments and
agencies.
RECOMMENDED SOLUTION:
Designate DISA, preferably the DISSP division, to perform the coordination
function with respect to computer security issues at the operational level. The
organization could assume the responsibility of validating and maintaining automated
security tools for government administrators and security officers, as well as providing
operational advice and guidance.
B. FUTURE RESEARCH: SHOULD GOVERNMENT COMPUTER
SECURITY EXPERTISE BE CENTRALIZED?
1. Current Status
In this thesis, the author has focused on the need for a Unix security toolbox
and for an organization which can advise, assist, guide, and manage security tools. As
the defense budget is reduced, it will be necessary to decide whether it is necessary to
centralize a majority of computer security expertise (for unclassified systems) in one
organization. NSDD 145 gave NSA the responsibility to manage INFOSEC, but the
question of how best to utilize scarce personnel resources has not been addressed. It
may be time to decide if there is a better organizational structure and process for
managing computer security throughout the government. Though necessary to maintain
computer security expertise, making changes to organizational structure and
management processes will be a tremendous challenge for the future.
ARPA has been a leader in respondnig to and funding the development of
new technology which made networks such as the Internet a reality. The technology
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supporting vast networks like the Internet has now matured to the point that DOD must
consider the security vulnerabilities of unclassified government-owned networks. With
network technology constantly evolving and the resources shrinking. centralization of
computer security expertise must be considered as an alternative.
In the author's opinion, though INFOSEC in DOD is centrally managed by
NSA, the actual results of this management is not felt at lower levels. Each of the
military service components must still develop computer security expertise
individually, without the benefit of a well established computer security training
program or professionalization standards. Indeed, the guidance for the Executive
Branch of government has been that all departments and agencies develop a
comprehensive Information Security (INFOSEC) policy for office automation systems.
Each organization must set up a training program for security officers, administrators,
and users. The general guidance does not stipulate at what level within each
organization that computer security responsibility should be managed. [NTIS87] Part
of the problem is the inherent difficulty of developing and executing policy in an area
of expertise that must constantly evolve to keep up with technology. Coping with
constant change is a difficult barrier to overcome in hierarchal government
organizations.
The government attempts to retain as much in-house expertise as possible.
Unfortunately, the speed of advancing technology has outpaced the ability to keep
trained and experienced personnel, familiar with computer security issues. The
troubling aspect of current practice is the standard to which policy is developed and
personnel are trained. Who trains the trainers? It is well know what kind of training it
takes to make a qualified military pilot and the other specialized training needed for
specific airframes and operational scenarios. The proof of the training is demonstrated
during flight qualifications and eventually in combat. What kind of training and
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certification qualifies a computer security professional and who should be qualified to
set up an information security program?
2. The Need for Professional Standards
There is a need for professional standards so that competency can be
measured, and this issue has not yet been resolved within DOD. Indeed, the topic of
professional certification for computer science specialists has been quite contentious
because of the difficulty in prescribing the standards. [CONG89I In the meantime, no
standards are in place and technology continues to advance.
It is not adequate to simply direct that security policy be implemented.
Without professional standards, the quality of INFOSEC programs will vary by
organization. This type of fragmented approach hinders the ability of DOD to respond
to the challenges posed by increased technological capability. Professional standards
would ensure a specific level of expertise, but the only cost effective means to keep
enough qualified computer security personnel is to centralize computer security assets
in one organization. The critical issue is in the creation of a professionalization program
and then determining how to manage career paths to ensure the military personnel
remain competitive. Such a program could be based upon other professionalization
programs such as the program used by the National Security Agency.
A proven method to guide the training and retention of top quality personnel
is to set professional standards and give incentives for their attainment. A
professionalization program would ensure that computer security personnel attain a
minimum level of expertise which can be documented. A core set of requirements
would need to address the basic knowledge and experience needed in the relevant areas
of expertise. That basic knowledge would be a general professionalization standard,
along with a required experience level (i.e. 2-5 years). Particular aspects of
professionalization, could thei be treated like a specializations, with a requisite amount
of additional training and experience. It wouldn't be practical to initially train a person
53
to be an expert in all relevant aspects of computer security due to the time required.
Additional training, education, and job experience would qualify a person in specific
areas of expertise.
3. Managing Expertise
In the author's opinion, the best short term solution to encourage professional
standards and enhance security expertise would be to realign an existing organization.
using billets from the military services and other DOD organizations that currently have
the personnel. The best choice for realignment would appear to be the Defense
Information Systems Agency (DISA) which is currently undergoing organizational
change. The best location for computer security professionals within DISA would be
the Defense Information Systems Security Program (DISSP). DISSP is a relatively new
organization within DISA and it is currently attempting to define an expanded role in
DOD INFOSEC.
The charter of DISSP should be reevaluated with a consideration of the
following structure. Due to the critical nature of computer security and INFOSEC,
especially for military purposes, the organization should be a semi-autonomous arm of
DISA, with a military officer (at least 0-7 equivalent) as commander and with a civilian
deputy. The military commander position should -e rotated bezween the services to
ensure computer security issues are evenly addressed for all services. The civilian
deputy should be appointed by the head of DISA and should serve a longer term than
the military commanders in order to maintain continuity of policy. Computer security
personnel from the military services should be incorporated into DISSP, and the
organization should have the authority to conduct liaison with any government
organization of any department when dealing with operational computer security
issues.
DISSP should promulgate computer security standards for the government
(focusing on sensitive unclassified information), with the assistance of NIST and NSA,
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and to provide advice and assistance for all government agencies on computer security
matters. (NSA would retain its responsibility for classified information.) An
organization like DISSP would gain expertise from having a professional cadre of
computer security personnel, and it would provide a consistency in policy by the
reduction in duplicative effort among other organizations.
Civilian personnel in the organization would provide long-term continuity.
while the military personnel would bring in operational experience with which to
improve security techniques. The military will gain from experience obtained by its
personnel during an assignment as a computer security specialist. As military personnel
are trained and gain experience in such an organization, they will take with them a much
better understanding of computer security issues into future assignments.
4. Tomorrow
A centralized computer security "brain trust" is needed. This can be
accomplished in the near term by physically relocating personnel to a single
organization, but it may also require a completely new way of thinking about
organizations. A virtual organizatiou may well be what is required, eliminating the
need for physical co-location of computer security experts. Once distributed computing
becomes more widespread, virtual organizations can be created, which could yield the
result of having al government computer security experts available to solve problems
and provide guidance. This type of organizational concept will require new
management techniques, coupled with an in-depth understanding of information
technology.
5. Research on Managing Expertise and Standards
The author proposes the development of professional standards and new
methods of managing computer security expertise. These issues are critical for the
protection of sensitive unclassified information and a plan of action should be
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implemented. Further study is recommended to explore new management techniques
which can use technology to synthesize and coordinate computer security within DOD.
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APPENDIX
This appendix should be used to provide amplifying information for concepts
discussed in the body of the thesis. There is some terminology used in the preceding
chapters which will not be r'adily understood without an acquaintance with Unix
security. The Unix operating system is complex and unless the reader has worked
extensively with the security mechanisms in Unix, some concepts will require further
reading. The appendix attempts to focus on those areas of Unix security which need to
be emphasized for this paper. It is important to point out that there are many sources of
information on Unix Security, and good security practices will require a familiarity with
a wide variety of sources.
The information in the following chapters was obtained from several sources. The
primary source was "Practical Unix Security" by Garfinkel and Spafford. [GARF91]
The order of information presented was adapted from that of the book to highlight
particular concerns relevant to this paper. Information from other sources is added
where deemed appropriate, and indicated by references.
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I. UNIX
The Unix operating system "...was not designed from the start to be secure. It was
designed with the necessary characteristics to make security serviceable." --a quote
from Dennis Ritchie, one of the original developers of Unix.
Unix does provide memory protection and access Lontrols, but because Unix began
in the "open" environment of universities and research institutions, security was not a
critical factor in the development process. The security that was included in Unix was
more to protect the operating system from being "crashed." The design of the operating
system allows flexibility in running programs, but also leaves open the possibility that
a program flaw will cause "security holes." The potential for "introduced flaws"
dictates that the system must be monitored closely in order to ensure "security holes"
are not allowed to compromise the system.
Unix was not developed to operate while connected to outside computer resources
such as Wide Area Networks or Distributed Networks. Subsequently, the proliferation
of communication lines and networks have increased the security threat to Unix
systems. Since the advanced networking capability for Unix was developed later than




Before a user is assigned a password, the first consideration should be the choice
of an appropriate username. There are several important factors which should be
considered when assigning usernames. The username is only part of a Unix account
which consists of the username and password. Because the username is an identifier, all
usernames should be at least three characters long. Usernames should all be unique
names and Unix special account names should not be used. Users can have more than
one account and more than one username.
B. PASSWORDS
The password is an authenticator which should not be displayed on the system.
An account can be locked out after a preset number of unsuccessful password attempts.
This capability is a good security measure, because the system administrator must then
unlock the account. If allowed, the password can be changed by the user with the
passwd command.
1. /etc/passwd
The /etc/passwd file maintains unique identifiers for all users on a Unix
system. The file "...contains the username, real name, identification information, and
basic account information...". The following example shows the fields used to identify
each account and Table 1 gives the meaning of each field.
i.e. brown:eZ3/.bs7BZ3dx:1 11:110 :Tom Brown:/u/brown:/bin/csh
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111 User Identification Number (UID)
110 Group Identification Number (GID)
Tom Brown User's Full Name
/u/brown User's Home Directory
/bin/csh User's Shell
[GARF91: p. 23]
2. Encrypted Password System
Only encrypted versions of passwords are stored on the Unix system.
Crypt(3), a one-way function, is used to encrypt a password before it is stored on the
system. It is based on the Data Encryption Standard (DES), and the result of crypt(3)
is eleven printable characters. The eleven characters provided by crypt(3) are the
characters actually stored in the /etc/passwd file.
Upon login a user password is taken by /bin/login and encrypted with the
one-way function. The result of the function is then compared with the /etc/passwd
version of the password.
a. DES SALT
The SALT is a 12-bit number used by DES to change the result of an
encryption. The/bin/passwd program selects the SALT. [GARF91: p.31] The SALT is
then converted to a digraph and stored with the encrypted password.
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TABLE 2: ENCRYPTED PASSWORD FORMAT




Note: If two users choose the same password, each password will have
different representations in the password file.
3. The System Administrator's Role
Password security is the first line of defense for many Unix networks. There
are several actions which can be taken by the administrator to ensure a strong password
system. One consideration for the administrator is whether to use a password selection
or checking program to assist users in choosing secure passwords. Password generators
have also appeared; however, users do not normally like to use such programs because
they wish to choose their own password.
4. Shadow Password File
In order to make it more difficult for attackers to exploit password
vulnerabilities, shadow password files are used so that the encrypted passwords cannot
be read by users on a system. This type of file is used to store encrypted passwords
separately (sometimes with other security data) from the additional information
resident in a normal password file. The shadow password file is set so that only root can
read the file, offering more protection from attackers. Many programs require user
information but not the password; therefore, they can use the normal password file to
retrieve needed data. [FERB93] Unix systems classified as C2 have a shadow password
capability. Administrators should also ensure that there are no extra copies of /etc/
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passwd residing on the system in a location that is readable by the public or by
unauthorized users.
5. Password Aging & Login Restrictions
Some systems allow the administrator to limit the life of a password, forcing
the user to change passwords on the expiration date. Password aging and expiration can
enhance system security by ensuring old passwords do not remain on the system. Users
should be made aware of the purpose of changing passwords, and advised to change
their passwords on a periodic basis.
Users are sometimes required to travel, leaving the account basically
dormant. When a user will not be using the system for a long period of time, it may be
appropriate to disable login to that account until the user returns. Disabling the login is
a simple procedure which is done by placing an asterisk [*] before the first character of
the password in the /etc/passwd file. [GARF91: p. 41]
exbrown:*23dFD5cv~mK:181:100 :John Brown :/n/brown :/bin/csh
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II1. USER IDENTIFICATION
A. USER IDENTIFIER (UID)
The UID is a 16 bit number ranging from -32768 to 32767 or ranging from 0 to
65535. The numbers 0-9 are reserved for the system, with user numbers beginning at
20 or 100. The UID is kept in the /etc/passwd file, after being assigned to a user.
The system actually uses the UID to identify the user, not the user name. Two
users with the same UID are considered to be the same user by Unix. The UID is the
unique identifier and not the login name or password. It is not a good practice to assign
two users with the same UID.
B. GROUP IDENTIFIER (GID)
Each user on the system must belong to at least one group. Groups are assigned a
name as well as a GID. Upon creation of a user account, the administrator assigns the
GID and name. Each group is allowed specific privileges on the system, such as read,
write, and/or execute capability for specific files, directory structures, or peripheral
devices.
The GID of the primary group associated with a user is stored in the /etc/passwd
file. Groups provide the administrator another method of controlling access to the
system, specific applications or other areas which require protection.
1. /etc/group
A database of group information, similar in format to the /etc/passwd file, is
stored in the /etc/group file. The most critical group is the "wheel" group, which
normally refers to a listing of all the system administrators. The "users" group may be
assigned for all users on the system.
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The primary group for each user will be the group number assigned in the /
etc/passwd file. Users can be assigned to other groups in addition to the primary group
and those groups are handled differently according to the version of Unix being used.
Example of/etc/group entry: wheel:*:O:root, brown, alex




0 Group Identification Number (GID)
root, brown, alex Users assigned to the group
[GARF9l: p. 47]
2. System V Unix
In System V Unix, the user can belong to only one group at a time. The
"newgrp" command is used to change the users current group and the user is allowed
to change groups, without regard to whether the user is a member of the group. If the
user wishes to change groups but is not a member of the group requested, the system
will request the group password. If the correct password is provided, the user is placed
in the group temporarily, acquiring all privileges of that group.
The password for a group is calculated in the same manner as the normal
user's account password. Most systems do not have programs to change group
passwords.
3. Berkeley Unix
In this version of Unix, the users may belong to more than one group,
simultaneously. The /bin/login program is used to automatically scan the /etc/group
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file. Once scanned, the program places the user in the particular groups where he or she




Root i. the most important special user, also called the superuser. The
superuser has their own password called the "root password" and the UID of root is "0".
The root account provides "housekeeping" functions which provide complete control
over the operating system.
There are no security checks of root operations when the superuser runs a
program, which highlights the importance of protecting the root password. Because of
the powerful nature of using root privilege, the superuser should not use the root
account as a personal account. The root account should only be used to perform system
checks or system administration duties.
The su command is used when the administrator needs to become superuser
and perform administration duties. The su command logs the time and user
identification when it is run, providing an audit trail of users in the root account. The
normal procedure for the system administrators should be to log in under their own user
account and then use the su command to perform duties in the root account.
Despite significant capabilities, the superuser does have a few restrictions
placed upon their activities. The superuser cannot make changes to a file system if it is
mounted as Read-Only. Such a filesystem would have to be unmounted and then
remounted as a Read-Write mode filesystem. Another limitation is that the superuser
cannot decrypt stored passwords (assuming non-use of the crack program). The
superuser can, however, record passwords as they are typed in by the user. The
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superuser cannot terminate a process that has entered a wait state in the operating
kernel. The only recourse for the superuser would be to shut down the system, which
kills all processes.
Because the superuser is the most powerful user with all privileges, it is this
power that is the main vulnerability in Unix system security. Unix attacks often
comprise the efforts of an attacker to become the superuser. Also, many of the security
holes in Unix have been associated with the process of regular users obtaining superuser
privileges.
2. Unix-to-Unix Copy Program (UUCP)
UUCP is the portion of the system which can transfer files and electronic mail
between systems which are connected via phone lines. The remote computer must login
as uucp when it calls another Unix system. Email that is to be transmitted is stored in
directories that cannot be read by users, but only by uucp. UUCP vulnerability will be
discussed in more detail in subsequent sections.
D. SUBSTITUTE USER
The comamand su is an abbreviated form of "substitute user". It is used to change
a user's ID on a temporary basis. The format below shows how a system administrator
gains root access from his or her personal account:
% /bin/su
% password: IamRoOt
<After providing the correct password, the user now has root privileges, as denoted by
the pound sign at the prompt.>
The /bin/su vice su command should be used by t'Ve administrator when
becoming the superuser, because using the entire path helps protect against Trojan
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Horses. Recent versions of Berkeley Unix require a user to be in the wheel group before
they can use the su command to become root. Some versions of su allow users in the
wheel group to use their personal password to gain superuser access. Attempts to gain
superuser access using the su command are logged in the /usr/adm/messages or /usr/
adm/sulog (System V) file.
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IV. FILES
Unix has a structured file system, which from a very basic point of viewk includes
files and directories. Directories contain files, but they also contain devices (with
logical names), symbolic links, and other directories in a hierarchal arrangement.
The Is -IF command gives a more detailed listing of files in a directory as indicated
below. In System V, the group name replaces the user name when using Is -IFg. Table
7 gives the meaning of the display generated by the Is command shown below.
i.e. -rwxrwxrwx 1 brown 606 Sep 23 23:59 unixinfo/
Table 8 shows the different symbols that can appear at the end of a file name.
fhere are three times associated with a file: mtime, atime, and ctime. The mtime
and atime can be easily changed by a system library routine but the crime normally
cannot be changed and reflects the last time the file is written, undergone a protection
or owner change. It is important to note that the ctime can be changed if an attacker
obtains superuser access and changes the system clock.
Is -I includes the modification time of the file. (mtime)
Is -Iu includes the last access time of the file. (atime)
IS -IC includes the inode change time. (ctime)
TABLE 4: EXAMPLE OF "Is -IF" OUTPUT FIELDS
FIELD CONTENTS
File Type. (A dash denotes a file.)
rw-r--r-- File Permissions
1 Number of Hard Links of the file.
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TABLE 4: EXAMPLE OF "is -IF" OUTPUT FIELDS
FIELD CONTENTS
brown File owner.
606 File size, in bytes.
Sep 23 23:59 Time the file was last modified.
unixinfo File name.
TABLE 5: FILENAME SYMBOLS
SYMBOLS MEANING
(blank) Regular File.
* Executable Program or Command File.
/ Directory




1. Read, Write & Execute
The file type is indicated by the first character of the file permission. The
various file types are shown in Table 6. [GARF91: p. 61] The characters which follow
the file type indicate read, write, or execute permission for owners (1 st group of 3
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characters after the file type), groups (2nd group of 3 characters), and others (3rd group
of 3 characters) respectively.
Example: drwxrwxrwx <This entry before the directory name indicates that
the owner of the directory. groups, and others all have the ability to read, write, and
execute any files which are in that directory.>




C Character Device (ex. printer)
b Block De vice (ex. disk or tape)
I Symbolic Link
S Socket (Device)
p FIFO (System V only)
2. I-chmod"
a. Changing File Permissions
Example format: chmod [-R] [agou] [+-=] [rwxXstugol] filename
Example entries: % chmod o+w myfile
% chmod o+r myfile
% chmod -R o+x mydirectory
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TABLE 7: FILE PERMISSION SYMBOLS FOR "chmod"
SYMBOLS MEANING
-R Recursive chmod (BSD only)
a,g,o,u Modifies All, Group, Other, or User permissions
+, -, = Adds, Removes, or Replaces current permissions
r,w,x,X,s,t, (r)Read, (w)Write, (x)Execute, (X)Execute only if the file
u,g,o,I is a directory, (s)SUID/SGID, (t)Sticky Bit, (u)Takes per-
missions from user's permissions, (g)Takes permissions
from group's permissions, (o)Takes permissions from
other's permissions, (l)Enable's mandatory locking on
file (System V only)
filename filename can be a single file or a group of files
b. Octal File Permissions
The chmod command may also be used with 4-digit octal
representations for file permissions.
TABLE 8: GENERIC OCTAL FILE PERMISSIONS FOR "chmod"
OCTALNUMBER FILE PERMISSIONNUMBER
0400 Read by Owner
0200 Write by Owner
0100 Execute by Owner
0040 Read by Group
0020 Write by Group
0010 Execute by Group
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TABLE 8: GENERIC OCTAL FILE PERMISSIONS FOR "chmod"
OCTALNUMBER FILE PERMISSIONNUMBER
0004 Read by Others
0002 Write by Others
0001 Execute by Others
[GARF9I: p. 67]
Example entry: chmod 666 *.txt (Allows the file owner, groups, or
others to read or modify any file and with the extension ".txt")
B. "UMASK"
The umask (user file-creation mode mask) uses a three-digit octal number to set
the default file permissions for a new file. The umask is set in the .login, .cshrc, or
.profile files. Umask is a built-in function which is available in various shells such as
sh, ksh, csh. The bits that are set in the umask correspond to the permissions that are
not set automatically upon creation of a new file. This is accomplished by using a
bitwise complement procedure.
The default for most Unix utilities is 666 (any user may read or modify the file).
The default for most Unix programs is 777 (any user may read, write, or execute the
program)
Examples of how umask is used:
0666 (default file creation mode denoting that any user can read/write to the file)
0022 (umask octal number)
0644 (resulting permission, based on combining 0666 and 0022)
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TABLE 9: "umask" RESULTS (BASED ON FILE DEFAULT OF 0666)
umask User Access Group Access Other
0000 all all all
0002 all all Read
0007 all all None
0022 all Read Read
0037 all Read None
0077 all None None
[GARF91: p. 711
C. SUID (Set-UID) and SGID (Set-GID)
The SUID/SGID program is a program that can assume another UID/GID when
it runs. When such a program is run by a user, the program obtains the permissions of
the user who created the SUID/SGID program. Most SUID/SGID programs are root
programs, which means that the program assumes root privileges when it is run. SUID/
SGID programs can be the cause o, serious security holes if they are not properly
maintained. The reason for vulnerability stems from the fact that if an attacker can
manipulate the operating system to run a command as root, the attacker can trick the
system into allowing the attacker root access.
If the system uses mounted file systems, especially remote file systems, the SUID/
SGID programs should be disabled. Disabling can be accomplished using the nosuid
option with the mount command. The primary reason for using nosuid is to ensure that
SUID/SGID files are not imported from the mounted filesystem.
Example: /etc/mount -o nosuil gemini:/grus /usr/grus
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D. DEVICES
Devices are treated like files in the Unix system. The O/S kernel changes program
reads and writes to an 1/0 operation when a device file is specified.
Sample of special devices:
/dev/null (trashs anything written to this device)
/dev/console (writes to the console anything written to the file)
/dev/kmem (reading & writing to this device accesses the
kernel's memory)
Some devices should be world-writable, such as /dev/null,/dev/tty, and /dev/
console. Most other devices should not be readable or writable. The /dev/kmem device
is particularly vulnerable to an attacker if it is not properly protected. All access to the
O/S kernel's memory should be strictly controlled. A security checklist should include
checking the status of all devices.
E. FILE OWNERSHIP
The chown command is used to change file ownership. In Berkeley Unix, only
the superuser can change file ownership, as compared with System V in which the user
can execute the chown command to change ownership. Changing ownership is a
powerful command, and can lead to security problems in System V. Problems are
possible when an attacker gains access to a system because the chown command can be
used to hide the evidence of their presence.
F. GROUPS
The chggrp command is used to change the group access to a file. Only the file's
owner, who is a member of the group to which the file is to be changed, or the superuser
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can change a file's group in Berkeley Unix. In System V Unix, the owner may change
the group of any file owned to any other group. The potential vulnerability is obvious.
G. IMPORTANT UNIX FILES
TABLE 10: COMMON SUID PATH AND FILE LISTINGS [N BSD UNIX
PATH SUID FILES
/usr/etc/ ping; timedc; rdump
/usr/lib/ sendmail; lpd; ex3.7recover; ex3.7preserve
/usr/lib/xl 1/ getcons
/usr/lib/u ucp/ uucico; uuclean; uuxqt
/usr/bin/ mailq; newaliases; iostat; atq; at; atrm; tip; cu; login; su;
uucp; uux; uulog; uuname; uusnap; uupoll; uuq; uusend;
ruusend
/usr/bin/xl11/ xterm
/usr/ucb/ lpr; lpq; lprm; w; uptime; quota; rep; rdist; riogin; rsh;
talk; chsh; chfn




The password is a critical point of vulnerability for an account and those accounts
without passwords should be considered a crucial security violation. It is possible to use
the awk command to search for missing account passwords in order to detect weak
points in the system. i.e. % awk -F: 'Iength($2)<1 (print $1)' < /etc/passwd
[GARF91: p. 90] Different systems may have passwords located in files other than /etc/
passwd, therefore, the administrator should check the documentation for the particular
version of Unix being used, to determine search parameters. The table below shows the
meaning of awk commands used for conducting searches of files. [SOBE89: p. 4111
TABLE 11: EXAMPLE OF "awk" COMMAND
FORMAT MEANING
awk Utility in Unix which performs pattern
scanning and report generating.
-F: Indicates that the Field Separator is a
colon ":".
length($2)<1 Specifies that the utility is to scan the 2nd
field and check to see if it is less than 1.
{print $1) Specifies that the first field of each entry
searched is to be printed.
</etc/passwd Specifies the file which is to be scanned.
Many vendors have shipped systems with default account passwords or with no
passwords at all. The administrator should always check a new system for accounts
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which may already be assigned a default password and change the password
immediately. Another option is to disable the account by placing an asterisk in the
password field. A good starting point is to first check the /etc/passwd file to see what
accounts have been set up by the vendor. It is also important to note that some software
applications establish an account and password uporn installation. These passwords
should always be changed after the installation process is completed.
Some special accounts only run a single command and may not have a password.
ex. finger, date, who, and sync. Single command accounts should not be allowed to
have any shell escapes, nor should they take any sort of keyboard input. The goal is to
ensure that such accounts cannot be made interactive with the user, because an attacker
could exploit this weakness.
Open accounts have names like open or guest and may not require passwords.
Such accounts are weak points in system security, where an attacker may try to gain
access to parts of the system other than the authorized work area. Open accounts are not
recommended, but if they are necessary, password protection should be seriously
considered.
This type of shell can be used to limit the vulnerability of an open account. The
restricted shell "rsh" (System V) first executes commands in the $HOME/.profile file
which restricts the user to the current directory. The user cannot use command names
that contain a slash, cannot redirect output, and cannot change the path. The
administrator can also ensure that the user cannot use the account over a network. BSD
Unix uses the sh program to create the rsh restricted shell, which has the same
capability as under System V. Restricted accounts should not have applications that can
run subprograms, since this capability provides another possible point of attack.
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B. GROUP ACCOUNTS
Group accounts are those used by more than one user, using only one password.
Group accounts are a potential security weakness because of the lack of accountability
in determining who does what on the system, and the difficulty of controlling the
paswnrd. An alternative to a group account is the creation of a group in the /etc/group
file and adding each user to this Unix group. The user must first access the system with
their own password and then access the group.
C. DORMANT ACCOUNTS
If a user is scheduled to be away for a significant period of time, the administrator
should consider disabling the account. There are three basic methods to prevent
unauthorized login to a dormant account, which include changing the password.
disabling the password, or changing the login shell. A procedure to find dormant
accounts is to use a shell script and the last command to find accounts that have not
been opened for a significant period of time. Specific examples of shell scripts can be
found in several texts. [GARF91: pp. 98-99]
D. ACCOUNT PROTECTION
The wheel group is used for all system administrators. Belonging to the wheel
group allows the administrators the capability of using the su command to obtain
superuser access. [FERB93]
Secure terminals are used to protect root access and make it more difficult for an
outside attack designed to guess passwords. Unless the terminal is annotated as secure
in the /etc/ttys file, the superuser is not allowed to login directly, using the root
password. The administrator would have to log in as a regular user and then use the su
command to gain root privilege. This procedure makes an attacker's job more difficult.
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VI. SECURING DATA
The most critical aspect of any system is the Backup. Restoration of a system is
straightforward and loss of data is a minimal problem if backups are conducted on a
timely basis. All files and directories should be backed up, with particular attention to
user files, system databases like /etc/passwd and /etc/ttys, and system directories that
are very important such as/bin and /usr/bin. Backups of critical system databases is an
essential security precaution. Databases such as /etc/passwd are very sensitive and files
such as /etc/rc and /usr/lib/crontab can be modified and become a threat if an intruder
gains access to the system.
Backup of critical files give the administrator the ability to recover from attacks on
the system. Table 12 provides a listing of some of the important files.
TABLE 12: IMPORTANT UNIX FILES
FILE PURPOSE OF BACKUP
/etc/passwd File may be used to recover new accounts.
/etc/group File may be used to recover new groups.
/etc/rc* File may be used to recover changes in the boot sequence.
/etc/ttys or /etc/ File may be used to recover terminal configuration
ttytab or /etc/init- changes.
tab
/usr/lib/aliases File may be used to recover changes in mail delivery.
/etc/exports File may be used to recover changes in NFS filesystem
security.
/etc/netgroups File may be used to recover changes in network groups.




The goal of checking data integrity is to prevent unauthorized modifications and
to provide a means by which an administrator can verify the integrity of system files.
Modifications to files can result from many actions, from intruder attacks to inadvertent
user activity. The system administrator should keep a checklist of files which should be
regularly checked for integrity. Files such as /bin and /usr/bin are seldom modified and
would be good candidates for regular integrity checks.
Using file permissions is the first line of defense for protecting data integrity.
Software can also be used to enhance integrity by using the mount command to ensure
appropriate disk drives are mounted in a Read-Only mode. This procedure normally
cannot be circumvented unless an attacker gains root access. A disk may be write-
protected to prevent inadvertent or unwanted writes, but this method complicates disk
usage because all partitions are restricted.
Unix commands as well as programs like Tripwire can be used to check file
integrity. The diff and cmp commands are used to compare files, in addition to the rdist
command (BSD Systems) which can be used to compare files between two systems.
Rdist may also be used to update target files or can be run by the administrator to update
or check software on a regular basis.
B. LISTS & SIGNATURES
Using the Is and find commands, an administrator can write a script file to list the
files and directories, as well as check parameters such as modification time, owner.
group, size, etc. The results of the listing should be stored to a file, which can be
compared with future utilization of the script.
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A simple form of signature is to use the output of the list procedure above. Some
versions of Unix have the sum command with will calculate a checksum for a file. A
better solution would be to use a cryptographic checksum or a good hash function.
Newer versions of Unix have a des command which can create a cryptographic
checksum. Other more specialized programs such as Tripwire incorporate sophisticated
cryptographic digital signature methods.
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VII. LOG FILES
Log files keep a history of the commands executed by users and the times that the
users login to the system. The audit system of Unix is based on the log files.
A. /usr/adm/lastlog
The last login time of each user is kept in the lastlog file and should be displayed
each time a user logs into the system. The last login time may also be displayed by using
the finger command. The lastlog information call assist in determining if an
unauthorized user has accessed an account, especially if all users check there own
accounts upon each login.
B. /etc/utmp & /usr/adm/wtmp
The /etc/utmp file records all users who are currently logged into the system and
/usr/adm/wtmp records all logins and logouts. In BSD Unix, the information stored by
these files include the username, hostname, terminal name, and the logon time of the
user. In System V Unix, the information stored includes the username, device name.
terminal line number, process identification, exit status of the process. a code for the
entry, and the time of the entry.
The commands who, users, and finger use the wtmp file to provide the
information requested. The last program is used to display all logins and logouts
associated with every device on the system. The last program uses the utmp file for its
information. It should be obvious that an attacker with access to these log files can
eliminate information concerning his or her presence on the system.
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C. /usr/adm/acct
This file can be used to log all commands from all users. This type of system
accounting procedure is used primarily for security reasons and when CPU time is
related to billing. The /usr/adm/acct must be frequently purged and put in a summary
file due to the amount of data that can quickly accumulate.
The accton command is used to initiate system accounting and recording in the /
usr/adm/acct. Upon termination of a process the Unix kernel records the username,
command name, CPU time utilized, and the time the process was exited.
The lastcomm command is used to display the information in a readable format.
The command should be executed only by the administrator, especially if it is used to
monitor intruders on the system.
D. LOGS
In BSD Unix, the openlog, syslog, and closelog commands are used to record logs
of system functions. The /etc/syslog.conf file is used to control the location of logged
messages. The following example shows the format of the /etc/syslog.conf file.
[GARF91: p. 133]
*.err; kern.debug; auth.notice
(Meaning: All error messages, kernel debug messages. and notice messages
which are generated by the authorization system will be sent to the console. If the
system console is defined as a printer, then the messages will be printed. A file name
could also be added to the line above so that the output is saved to a file.)
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VIII. THREATS TO THE SYSTEM
Programmed threats are those types of attacks that exploit a program's execution
of instructions. Viruses are only one small portion of programmed threats, which
include Worms, Trojan Horses. Bacteria, Logic Bombs, and Back Doors.
Checking new software and ensuring that new software is received from a trusted
source is a very important protection measure. The damage caused from programmed
threats can range from merely a nuisance to unrecoverable data losses. Protection from
damage is the job of the system administrator and all of the users of the system. The
system administrator must institute appropriate security safeguards for the system.
Users must be made aware of their responsibility for following the security guidelines.
Unix attacks are primarily from trojan horses or back doors. The first places to look
for such problems are in the shell, the start-up mechanisms, and automatic mechanisms.
System attacks may intend to damage the system or to gain access to data or to the
system itself.
Path attacks are those where the attacker inserts a shell script in a compromisect
directory, which could then execute a command in a different manner. If a system
administrator changed to the problem account directory and executed a command. a
shell script could be ina,,vertently initiated.
Start-up file attacks are possible because once applications are set up and the
initialization procedures set, the start-up variables are rarely checked. Since
initialization options are conducted automatically, the start-up file is an attractive target
for an attacker. Start-up files should be protected so that the owner is the only person
who can have write access to the file. Table 13 gives some examples of files which can
be vulnerable to start-up attacks.
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TABLE 13: FILES VULNERABLE TO STARTUP ATTACK
FILES EXECUTION METHOD
.login, .profile, Executed by the shell when the user logs
/etc/profile into the system.
.cshrc, .kshrc May be executed at login or at a later time.
.emacs Executed when a user starts up the emacs
editor.
.exrc Executed when the vi or ex editor is
started.
.xinitrc Executed when XWindows is started.
.sunview Executed when sunview is started.
An example of a possible attack method follows:
% cat > .exrc
! (cp /bin/sh /tmp/.secret;chmod 4755 /tmp/.secret)&
AD
(If an attacker placed the preceding commands in every directory where he or
she has gained write access and if the superuser, at some point in the future, executes vi
or ex in any of the targeted directories, the command above will create a SUID sh which
is stored in a location specified by the attacker. The attacker can then use the SUID file
and take advantage of the system using a superuser SUID file.)
A. PROTECTING FILES
Always check for "world-writable" files, and modify the permission when
possible. If the .rhosts file is world-writable, an attacker could take over the account
remotely over a network. World-writable files, directories, or devices should always be
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kept to an absolute minimum. Devices can be a particularly serious security problem.
If a hard disk is made world-writable, an attacker can write files to the disk with a
potential for compromising the entire system. Group-writable files can be also be
dangerous and should be treated in the same category as world-writable files.
COPS and other security tools will assist the administrator in this function. The
find command can also be used to find world-writable files, directories, or devices. An
example of how to use the find command is shown below.
ex. find / -perm -2 ! \( -type s -o -type p -o -type I \) -print
<The example above prints all world-writable files. omitting sockets, pipes, and
symbolic links. [GARF91: p. 1671>
B. SUID/SGID
A listing of all SGID/SUID files on the system should be maintained. This list will
help in comparing authorized from unauthorized files found by regular scanning of the
system. An administrator should be wary of any SUID/SGID program that does not
reside in the /usr/etc, /usr/lib, /usr/ucb, /usr/bin, /bin, or /etc directory. It is also
important to note that a user who is allowed superuser access even for a short period of
time could be able to gain superuser access in the future, as demonstrated by the
example below.
% cp /bin/sh /usr/lib/.mysh
% chown root /usr/Iib/.mysh
% chmod 4755 /usr/lib/.mysh
SUID shell scripts made by the superuser should never be used due to the fact that
normal users can potentially gain superuser access. REMEMBER: "SULD shell scripts
cannot be made secure"!
Reminder of how SUID programs work: The normal operation of a process is
limited by the access privileges of the user of the program. A program can be made
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SUID (Set User ID) by changing the permission with the command chmod u+s. Once
SUID, any processes carried out by the program will have the same access permissions
as the owner of that program. Therefore, if root creates a program and it is made SUID,
any processes run by that program have root access privileges. If an attacker could alter





Security is a concern when using a modem because the connection is normally
outside of the location of the originator. Protecting the phone numbers associated with
a modem is the first line of defense in protecting serial communications. A better
protection mechanism is to have phone lines which only work in a one-way mode,
either calling out or calling in. In conjunction with one-way lines, the modems can be
segregated into call-out and call-in modems. By protecting the modems and phone
lines, a potential attacker is prevented from using common attack methods such as
"spoofing" the communications software of the target computer system. (Spoofing is a
method which tricks the system into treating the distant computer as an authorized
user.)
B. UNIX AND THE MODEM
Unix has the capability to send and receive data via modem communications. The
tip and cu commands are used to facilitate communications with other computers,
which could be using other operating systems. Using the UUCP capability, Unix can
use modems to send or receive electronic mail. The SLIP (Serial Line Internet Protocol)
or PPP (Point-to-Point Protocol) can be used with Unix and modems to connect remote
computers with the network.
Installing modems on a Unix system will require modification of system files
such as /etc/ttys, /etc/remote, /usr/lib/uucp/L-dev ices, /etc/inittab or /usr/lib/uucp!
Devices. Permissions for any device connected to modems should be set to 6(X) and
owned by root or uucp. If the permissions are not set correctly, users may be able to
read communications of other users on the system.
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1. Testing the Modem
Upon acquiring modems for a Unix system, the first important action is to test
the modem. Testing requires that the user communicate from another computer, calling
the modem to be tested. [GARF9I: pp. 186-192]
a. Procedures to Check Control Signals
(1) Use the tip or cu command to call the modem and try to login to the target
computer.
(2) Disconnect the telephone line from the originating modem. The user should be
returned to the Unix prompt.
(3) Call the modem once again and disconnect by turning off the sending modem.
The user should be returned to the Unix prompt.
(4) Call the modem once again, exit from the tip or cu program and leave the
modem connection in place. The user should be returned to the Unix prompt and the
modem should hang up automatically.
(5) Call the modem once again, and this time use a third terminal to kill your tip or
cu process. The modem should hang up automatically.
b. Procedures to Check Answering
(1) Call your computer. The login banner should print out on the screen. Login to
the computer using normal procedures.
(2) Use the tty command to determine the line being used, then logout. The phone
should be hung up by the computer.
(3) Call your computer again and login. Pull out the telephone line from the sending
modem.
(4) Call your computer again. The computer should allow you to login and you
should not have been placed in your previous shell. The old connection should have
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been broken, otherwise there is a problem. (This procedure should be repeated after
disconnecting the telephone line going into the sending modem.)
(5) Unix should logout a user anytime a connection is broken and if this does not
happen, a security flaw exists in the system.
(6) All modems connected to the Unix system should be tested thoroughly.
(7) Modems connected to hunt groups should be checked to ensure proper
operation.
2. Modem Security
(1) Protect access to the phone line itself.
(2) Disable call-forwarding on any line connected to a modern.
(3) Use a leased line when feasible.
(4) Ensure third-party billing is disabled. (This prevents persons from billing their
calls to the modem line.)
(5) Use modems that require a password to verify that an authorized user is
attempting access.
(6) Use modems that call back to the originator to verify the origin of the call.
(7) Use encryption.
(8) Use automatic number identification, if available.
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X. UNIX-TO-UNIX COPY (UUCP)
A. WHAT IS UUCP?
UUCP provides the capability to send mail or news to users over a network,
transfer files, and execute commands remotely. It can be used over serial
communication line or telephone lines connected to remote networks. UUCP can also
store and forward messages.
1. UUCP Commands
a. uucp
The uucp command copies files from one computer to another, with both
computers using the Unix operating system. The program can also be used to transfer
files from one remote computer to another, but the originating system must be
connected to both remote systems. The normal configuration of uucp only allows
copying into the /usr/spool/uucppublic directory. When copying files with uucp, the
filename can be changed as it is sent.
b. uux
The uux command executes programs on remote Unix systems. It was
also used to print files onto other computers, in the days before local area networks
became a common method of manipulating and transferring data. The primary use
today is sending mail between computers.
B. UUCP SECURITY
Security should be an immediate concern when a system allows programs or files
to be copied from one computer to another. The uucp programs must be SUID, but they
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should be run as uucp SUID and not root SUID. Since uucp has no special privileges,
the primary danger would be the possibility of an attacker being able to read files owned
by uucp or create files in world-writable directories or directories owned by uucp.
The uucp account can be assigned a password to prevent unauthorized access.
This protection should be considered by the administrator.
1. Security Provided by the System Administrator
A /etc/passwd entry should be established for each system that calls your
computer. Permissions can be set according to the access required. This method allows
much more control over how much access remote systems can have to your system. The
directories to which remote systems may have access should be limited. Remote file
retrieval can be denied altogether, if desired.
The administrator should require callback procedures to verify the originating
system. Access should be denied to any computers which have demonstrated suspicious
activity on your system.
2. UUCP Passwords
Changing the UUCP account password requires the superuser to use the
passwd command and the account name. UUCP account passwords should be set
immediately when a new Unix system is being set up. The /usr/lib/uucp/L.sys file
contains telephone numbers, accounts, passwords, etc. of remote systems with which
your system communicates. This file must be protected from unauthorized access.
Information in the L~sys file should be unreadable to anyone except UUCP.
C. UUCP-VERSION 2
Five programs are used in Version 2 in order to improve security and control
access to your system. The five programs are USERFILE, L.cmds, SEQFILE,
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FWDFILE, and ORGFILE. USERFILE and L.cmds are two of the more important
files.
1. /usr/lib/uucp/USERFILE
This program controls access to files which may be used by UUCP. It
specifies which directories are authorized access by remote systems, the login name that
the remote computer must use, whether callback is to be used, and which files may be
sent over UUCP by users on the local system. USERFILE can be used to give additional
UUCP privileges to specific users. The USERFILE should also have one file without a
username and one file without a system name. These files are used by uucico or uuxqt.
USERFILE entries have the following format:
smith, gemini c /usr/spool/uucppublic
TABLE 14: DEFINITION OF USERFILE FIELDS
ENTRY MEANING
smith User login that is used in /etc/passwd.
gemini The remote system's name.
C Callback Flag. (Optional)
/usr/spool/uucppublic Absolute pathname. If left blank, open
access is allowed to any file.
a. Local Users
A USERFILE entry can be made for all users allowed to transfer files.
but this capability is limited to 20 entries. An alternative to specifying entries for each
local user is to allow file transfer for every user. If the username is left blank, all local
users may transfer files.
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b. rermissions
The system can allow access to specific directories, for either users or
other systems. The sar -'e format below (in the USERFILE) allows the user smith and
the system gemiri to access the directories which follow.
smith, gemini /usr/spool/uucppublic /usr/spool/news
c. Callback
Callback is an effective security measure to ensure that you are
connected to an authorized system. Without callback, a remote system may be able to
call your local system using the parameters of a valid remote system. The calling system
could in fact be an attacker who has acquired the remote system's login and password.
Only one system may have the callback option enabled, otherwise a loop will be
initiated and no connection will be made.
d. Sample USERFILE
,/usr/spool/uucppublic
nuucp, /usr/spool/uucppublic (not needed in BSD 4.2,4.3)
smith, /usr/spool/uucppublic /ul/smith
root, /
utaurus, taurus /usr/spool/uucppublic !usr'src
e. Sample of Insecure USERFILES
The following is a sample USERFILE entry which allows all remote





The next USERFILE entry allows open access with which all users and
all remote systems can transfer files to any directory. [GARF91: pp. 205-2061
,i
2. L.cmds
The L.cmds file (may have other names according to the system used) is a
listing of the commands which may be used by remote systems via uucp. The uux
program will not execute any command not found in the L.cmds file. For example, if
rmail is not included, then users will not be able to receive mail from remote systems
(via UUCP). Some commands that can cause potential security problems in UUCP are
cat, rm, finger, and man; therefore, commands added to the L.cmds file should be
selected carefully so that inadvertent security holes are not created. One such security
hole is the ruusend command, because it allows a remote system to forward files from
your system. Table 18 is an example of a L.cmds file. [GARF91: p. 208]








D. BNU UUCP (HONEYDANBER UUCP)
In BNU UUCP, the USERFILE and L.cmds files are replaced with the
Permissions file. The Permissions file allows more control over UUCP security by
determining which commands may be executed by the remote system (like the L.cmds
file) and which files may be accessed. The Permissions file is scanned when the uucico
file is started. There are 13 different permission commands which are allowed by BNU
UUCP in the Permissions file. The permission commands allow much more flexibility
in securing UUCP connections. The permission commands are MACHINE=,
LOGNAME=, REQUEST=, SENDFILES=, PUBDIR=, READ=, WRITE=,
NOREAD=, NOWRITE=, CALLBACK=, COMMANDS=, VALIDATE=, &
MYNAME=. Table 16 shows the usage of each of the permission commands.
[GARF8I: pp. 211-215]
TABLE 16: PERMISSION COMMANDS
COMMAND MEANING
MACHINE= Used to denote the specific remote site that is to be
contacted by the local system. The system name is
inserted after the "=".
LOGNAME= Used to assign a login name for a remote site which
wishes to connect to your system.
REQUEST= Denotes whether the remote system is allowed to
transfer files. The default is "no".
SENDFILES= Determines whether queued files on the local system
will be transferred upon the call of a remote system
or wait until the local system initiates the call. The
default is "call", which means that files will be trans-
ferred when the local calls the remote.
PUBDIR= Denotes directories specified for public access. Only
used in conjunction with LOGNAME entries.
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TABLE 16: PERMISSION COMMANDS
COMMAND MEANING
READ= Denotes directories which uucico can read.
WRITE= Denotes directories which uucico can write.
NOREAD= Denotes directories which uucico can't read. (Over-
rides the READ command.)
NOWRITE= Denotes directories which uucico can't write.
(Overrides the WRITE command.)
CALLBACK= Denotes whether the local system is required to call-
bdck the remote system before conducting a file
transfer.
COMMANDS= Denotes the commands which may be used by
remote systems.
VALIDATE= Specifies the machine name that must be associated
with the LOGNAME=.
MYNAME= Used to change the UUCP name of the local system.
This is used for testing but should also be considered
a security issue because other systems can change
their name and try to log into your system via UUCP.
Note: The /usr/lib/uucp directory should be protected by its placement in the
NOWRITE list or by not placing it in the WRITE list.
E. UUCP SECURITY HIGHLIGHTS
UUCP control files should be protected, with access limited to the minimum
number of directories required. Each remote site should have a unique login whenever
possible. Commands which can be executed by remote systems, must be very limited.
The final word of caution for UIJCP is that if you don't use it. delete it!
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XI. NETWORKS
Networks (LAN, WAN, Distributed, etc.) have drastically changed the way in
which information is handled. The increased connectivity via computer networks
presents many security challenges, especially with operating systems such as Unix.
Unix is the predominant operating system used by host computers on the Internet;
therefore, Unix security issues can have a significant impact on the network.
A. TCP/IP AND UNIX SECURITY
The Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol provides reliable
communications capability for Unix systems connected to the Internet. Each end of the
TCP/IP connection has a 16 bit port number. When a connection is made on the
Internet, the connection can be defined by the two network addresses (32-bit numbers)
and two ports (16-bit numbers). Every network service that is "generally-known" to the
Internet has a unique port number which is used to contact the network. An example is
port # 513 which is used for the riogin network service.
Port numbers 0 to 1023 are referred to as "trusted ports" in Unix, because only the
superuser can originate connections from these ports. If an unauthorized user could use
a program to listen to port 513, then it would be possible to receive rlogin connections
from other users and obtain their passwords.
Other types of systems (non-Unix) can send packets from low numbered ports
and Unix will assume the connection is trusted. This means Unix can be spoofed by
other systems which do not use the "trusted port" convention.
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B. UNIX NETWORK SERVERS
The /etc/services and/etc/inetd.conf files are used to control network servers.
These files determine which servers are run once the system is contacted on a particular
communications port.
1. /etc/services
All network services provided by Unix must be listed in the /etc/services file.
The two primary types of servers are those that run continuously (i.e. nsfd) and those
that run when required (i.e. fingerd). The /etc/rc file is used to automatically start up
those servers that run continuously.
TABLE 17: FORMAT OF THE "/etc/services" FILE





This program is referred to as the "Internet daemon". It is a server program
which listens to the network ports and runs the appropriate server when needed. The
program is run by the /etc/rc file when the system is booted up. Once started, the /etc/
inetd file looks at the /etc/inetd.conf file, which lists the network services which are to
be handled by /etc/inetd.
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TABLE 18: FORMAT OF THE "/etclinetd.conr' FILE
Components:
Service, Socket Type, Protocol Type, Wait/Nowait, User, Command & Argument
telnet stream tcp nowait root /usr/etc/telnetd telnetd
tftp dgram udp wait nobody /usr/etc/tftpd tftpd
echo stream tcp nowait root internal
TABLE 19: FIELDS IN "inetd.conf" FILE
NAME MEANING
Service Name The service name that is in the /etc/services file.
Socket Type Specifies whether the service expects to communicate via
a datagram or stream.
Protocol Type TCP or UDP. TCP is used with stream and UDP is used
with datagrams.
Wait/Nowait Wait means the server will expect to process all data-
grams received. Nowait means a new server process is
executed for each additional connection request received.
User The UID that the server process is to be run as.
Command & The command name to be executed and the argument that




Telnet provides a "remote virtual ten ainal service", with telnet as the client
program and telnetd as the server program. Using telnet has the same vulnerability as
dialing in via a modem because there is the potential for unauthorized access. An added
vulnerability is that if someone has physical access to your network, network analysis
(snooping) software can be used to capture packets as they are sent. Since telnet is used
over the Internet, the potential for a security problem is magnified significantly.
2. rsh & rlogin
Remote terminal service (like telnet) is also provided by riogin (client) and
riogind (server). The riogind program does not require a username and if coming from
a "trusted host", a password is not required. The riogin program can be used over a
LAN or the Internet. Use of rsh (client) and rshd (server) allow the user to run a single
command on a remote system and the programs can only work when run from a trusted
host. Both riogin and rsh can only be used between Berkeley Unix Systems.
3. rexec
Users are allowed to execute commands on remote computers with the /etlc/
rexecd program. It does not require the user to be logged into the remote system;
however, the username, password, and the command to be executed are all transmitted
over the network and can be vulnerable to snooping.
Error messages are sent back to indicate incorrect usernames or passwords.
This feedback could also be utilized by an attacker. To improve security, the rexec
program can be disabled in the /etcinetd.conf file.
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4. finger
The finger program is used to find out usemame, full name, location,
telephone number, and login time of users on the system, but the information must be
in the /etc/password file to be available to finger. Finger can also be used to find out
who is logged onto remote systems. It may be disabled to enhance security, but the
trade-off is in limiting contact information to persons trying to conduct business with
your organization.
The /etc/fingerd program is used to make the finger service available to
everyone on the network. The /etc/fingerd programs prior to 1988 had a security flaw
that was exploited by the Internet Worm in the fall of 1988. All sites should have a
newer version of the program installed.
5. FTP (File Transfer Protocol)
FTP is a program which facilitates the transfer of files across a network and
between systems. The ftp portion of the program is the client and /etc/ftpd is the server
program. When using ftp, the user must login with a username and a password. All ftp
logins are recorded by the /usr/adm/wtmp file on the remote computer. Passwords and
usernames are transmitted over the network when using FTP, which causes a security
vulnerability when not using anonymous login procedures. Versions of ftpd older than
1988 have a security flaw and should be replaced.
a. Anonymous FTP
Anonymous FTP can be used to transfer files from sites which allow this
capability. The program /etc/ftpusers is a file that lists those users who are not allowed
to access files via FTP. All accounts not belonging to specific users should be included
in the file. (i.e. root, uucp, news, bin, ingres, daemon, nobody)
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b. Security of Anonymous FTP
Incorrectly set up, the anonymous FTP capability can be a serious
security vulnerability, giving anyone on the network access to your system. To preclude
denial of service, a file quota should be in place so that remote users cannot tie up the
system by transferring large files. A common configuration for FTP is for ftpd to be set
up as its own file system, with ftp as the home account and three directories in the
account (i.e. bin, etc, pub). [GARF9I: pp. 245-246]
TABLE 20: COMMANDS TO SET-UP FTP
COMMAND MEANING
mkdir -ftp/bin -ftp/etc -ftp/pub Creates FTP directories.
cp /bin/Is -ftp/bin Makes a copy of the Is program.
chmod 111 -ftp/bin/Is Protects the Is program.
chmod 111 -ftp/bin Protects the bin program.
chown root -ftp/bin Ensure root owns the directory.
seal -e 's/:[A:]*:/:*i' /etc/passwd Copies the /etc/passwd file and
> -ftp/etc/passwd changes passwords to asterisks.
sed -e 's/:([•:]*:/:*:/'/etc/group Copies the /etc/group file.
> -ftp/etc/group
chmod 444 ~ftp/etc/* Makes files in /etc not writeable.
chmod 111 -ftp/etc Makes the /etc directory execute
only.
chown root -ftp/etc Ensure root owns the directory.
chmod 1777 -ftp/pub Makes directory /pub writeable by
anyone.
chown ftp -ftp/pub Ensure that ftp owns the /pub
directory.
chgrp ftp -ftp/pub Changes the group.
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TABLE 20: COMMANDS TO SET-UP FTP
COMMAND MEANING
chmod 555 -ftp Make FTP readable and executable
by owner, group, & other.
chown root -ftp Ensure root owns the ftp directory.
Note: Setting the -ftp/pub directory to 1777 will allow users on the
network to leave files anonymously. This type of access should be approached
cautiously.
6. TFTP (Trivial File Transfer Protocol)
This file transfer program is UDP based and does not provide security.
Current versions of the program should be restricted so that it can only transfer files to
or from a specific directory. This program should not be used unless necessary and then
only with the new versions.
7. X Windows (A serious security hazard.)
X Windows is a windowing system for networked computers, which allows
a graphical display to be shared by many programs. X-based programs can display their
output on any computer on the network. The basic programs in X Windows include
xterm (terminal emulator), xclock (clock display), and xhost (a list of hosts from which
the X-Window server will accept connections). The xhost file will provide at least some
security, but any client that connects to the X-server can control the keyboard or mouse,
send keystrokes to applications or kill windows.
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XII. NIS AND NFS
A. NIS (NETWORK INFORMATION SYSTEM)
NIS is a distributed database that uses a NIS master server to store essential files.
The files stored on the NIS master server include host tables, group files, password files,
etc. Files on the NIS master server are shared by other computers on the network and
appear to the NIS clients as local files.













1. System Database Files and NIS
Files such as /etc/passwd and /etc/group have a special line in the system
database file which should begin with a "+" sign. The "+" sign tells any program that
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scans the client database file to retrieve the rest of the file from the NIS server. The NIS
client could have a /etc/passwd file format as follows: [GARF91: pp. 256-257]
root:sl4nOjf8Q66jJ:0:1 :System Administrator:/:/bin/sh
+:*:0:0:::
Since the "+" sign refers a program to the NIS server. account information
can reside in a single location, allowing easier management of the network. Note: The
entry "'+:*:0:0:::'" should not be used in the /etc/passwd file on the NMS server. Such
an entry would allow anyone to access your system simply by entering a "+" sign at the
login prompt.
The line "+:*:0:0:::" should be placed in the password file for all NIS clients.
This procedure will help system security in the case of the NIS server failing, since there
are some implementations of NIS which could allow login with a "+" should the NIS
server fail.
2. Netgroups
Netgroups are used to classify users and computers on the NIS network. They
are used with NMS or NFS to restrict who may have access to specific services. The
database for the netgroup is kept on the NIS master server and resides in the /etc/
netgroup or /usr/etc/netgroup files. [CURR92: p. 90]
TABLE 22: SAMPLE NETGROUP FILE
FORMAT MEANING
cs4601 (host% ,,) (host2,,) "cs460'1" is the Netgroup. The members
(host3,,) of the cs4601 netgroup are "(hostl,,)
(host2,,) (host3,,)".
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TABLE 22: SAMPLE NETGROUP FILE
FORMAT I MEANING
Note: Each member of the netgroup is a triple, meaning the structure is in the
form (host, username, domain). When the username is left blank, the match
comprises all users on the specified host. When the host is left blank, the speci-
fied user can be matched with any host in the netgroup. The domain is normally
left blank.
B. NFS (NETWORK FILESYSTEM)
NFS allows sharing of files by many computers, over a network. The NFS server
is normally a drive with mass storage capability, which can have files that are accessed
by many client computers. The clients mount the disk drive of the server, making it
appear as if it were a local disk drive. Many local computers can share the server at the
same time, as well as remote computers.
NFS server programs written for other operating systems give the capability of
accessing files across different platforms. By using NFS, files on the server can be read
or modified without logging into the server or supplying a password. Most NFS security
problems arise from its inherent capability.
1. Mount and NFS
The mount and NFS protocols are used to determine which filesystems are
available to which hosts. When a file system is mounted, NFS can execute the following
functions: CREATE, MKDIR. REMOVE, RENAME, RMDIR, LINK. LOOKUP,
ADDR, and SYMLINK.
The combination of mount and NFS are powerful, but the underlying security
implications must be considered by the system administrator. An example command
follows:
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/etc/mount gemini:/usr /Iocalusr (This command mounts the directorv /usr
on a server named gemini in a local directory called ilocalusr.)
2. /etc/exports
The /etc/exports file determines what kind of access a client may have on a
mounted filesystem, a., well as which clients are allowed to mount the server filesystem.




The preceding commands allow anyone in the "csdept" group to mount the
root directory; however, only the group "admin" has root privilege. The directory /usr
is exported as a Read-Only filesystem and is available to anyone on the Internet. The
directory /usr/spool/mail is exported so that anyone in the group "csdept" has access.
Table 26 gives the various security options available. [GARF91: pp. 263-2641
** filesystems should not be exported unless absolutely necessary **
TABLE 23: SECURITY OPTIONS FOR "/etc/exports"
OPTION MEANING
access=machinelist Exports the directory as Read-Only to
those hosts or netgroups which are listed.
rw=machinelist Exports the filesystem as Read-Write to
those hosts or netgroups listed, and Read-
Only to other hosts.
root=-machinelist This entry allows the superuser on the
listed hosts to have superuser access on
the server.
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TABLE 23: SECURITY OPTIONS FOR "/etc/exports"
OPTION MEANING
anon=uid This entry determines what UID will be
used for those NFS requests that do not
have a UID. Access can be disallowed by
entering a - I.
secure Directs NFS to use the Sun AUTHDES
authentication system.
Note: The security options pertain to the filesystem as a whole and not to
individual directories.
3. /usr/etc/showmount
The /usr/etclshowmount command can be used by the NFS server to
determine which clients have mounted directories from the server. The command can
also show wiich filesystems are exported, which directories have been mounted
remotely. and lists all hosts to include the directories which are mounted.
C. METHODS TO IMPROVE NFS SECURITY
Exported filesystems should be restricted to only those that are essential. If a
filesystem must be exported, it should be exported as Read-Only when feasible.
Machines that are exported to should also be restricted.
The NFS server should be owned by root. Executable programs used by NFS
should not be exported. If the programs must be exported, ensure they are Read-Only.
Filesystems should be exported as Read-Write only to "trusted- computers. Finally,
world-writable directories should never be exported. (i.e. tAmp, /usr/tmp, and /usr/
spool/uucppublic)
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D. METHODS TO IMPROVE NIS SECURITY
NIS is basically insecure. On most implementations of NIS, an attacker can get a
copy of the databases exported by the NIS server. The database car, disclose the
distributed password file. Security can be improved if the ypserv program is modified
so that it will only respond to authorized hosts on the network.
The ypbind program should be used with the -secure flag, so that it will not
accept data from a false ypserv server. It is important to remember that most, if not all,
security precautions can be rendered useless, if the attacker gains root access on the
local network.
E. THE BOTTOM LINE
If security is a major concern on the network in question, do not use NFS or NIS.
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